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ABSTRACT

COMBATING BUDGETARY COMPLICATIONS FROM THE MARCELLUS
SHALE: THE CASE FOR A PENNSYLVANIA GAS FUND

By
Daniel R. Thompson, II
May 2013

Thesis supervised by Kent Moors
The relationship between shale gas development and budgetary and
microeconomic externalities was studied. The extraction activity in the Barnett shale
formation provided a case study for assessing per-well highway infrastructure damage
and water usage. The creation of a predictive model based upon the Barnett was applied
to the Marcellus formation. The results showed support for the hypothesis that shale gas
development creates negative externalities that amount to unfunded mandates and freerider problems for states and localities. Implications and policy solutions, including the
case for a Pennsylvania natural gas fund, are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Western Pennsylvania stands on the cusp of a growing wave of economic and
energy development that will prove every bit as monumental and inescapable as the
Spindletop strike. Pennsylvania rests at the epicenter of Marcellus shale gas development,
arguably the largest unconventional natural gas reserve on the planet. As Pennsylvania
quickly adjusts to the new realities of having the state of its economy dictated by the
economics of resource extraction, the population will likewise need to understand,
manage, and mitigate the negative side effects of this extraction economy. If the state
government and policy makers do not prepare for these issues while Marcellus
production is still in its infancy, they will find these problems particularly difficult to
address in a reactive manner.
Many other states and nations have found themselves in a similar position –
possessing substantial mineral wealth which, when extracted, created the environment
that could potentially be impacted by price volatility, several types of inflation, and other
economic problems. Some have elected to establish what have been referred to in oil and
gas producing nations as oil funds, or more generally, natural resource funds (NRFs).
Such funds act as fiscal policy tools to support long-term management of resource
revenue. In Norway, for example, revenues from petroleum extraction are transferred into
the fund and then invested abroad, ―to avoid overheating the Norwegian economy and to
shield it from the effects of oil price fluctuations…. The aim is to have a diversified
investment mix that will give the highest possible risk-adjusted return within the
guidelines set by the [Ministry of Finance]‖ (―Government Pension Fund Global‖).

1

Energy has always been a critical component of political and economic concerns,
at all government levels. Concerns about energy factor directly or indirectly into almost
all political or economic issues. With Pennsylvania‘s position over the bulk of the
Marcellus shale formation, and the debate over the extraction of this energy source
quickly heating up, research on this topic in real-time can be valuable both for the policy
makers involved in the debate and the citizens of Pennsylvania.
Thus far, the debate over developing the Marcellus shale formation (MSF) 1 has
been limited to a debate between the pro-development/pro-business lobby and the
environmental lobby. Most people on both sides of the debate agree on many of the
overall likely economic benefits.2 However, the negative economic externalities have not
been fully considered. Because of this oversight in addressing inflation and volatility,
determining a way to deal with these issues has not been addressed. This thesis aims to
address the development of negative economic externalities like the Dutch Disease,
sectoral inflation, micro-inflation, and price volatility, as well as the destruction of nonrelated industries. This thesis will explore how these problems can be managed and
mitigated effectively by the creation of a natural resource fund.

1

The Marcellus shale formation is a large underground shale deposit from which
considerable amounts of natural gas will likely be extracted. More specific information
about this is provided later in this work.
2
Notable exceptions include people concerned about eco-tourism, particularly from the
perspective of water quality. Particularly on more localized levels, the loss of eco-tourism
commerce could be devastating (Delaware Riverkeeper).
2

Chapter 2: Review of the Relevant Literature
2.1 The Shift from Oil to Gas: Current Trends and Issues
Oil has been the dominant fuel for modern economic development for over a
century. The metaphorical engine of oil development began to roar in earnest with the
advent of the oil-fueled British Navy at the behest of the Admiral John Fischer. Since that
point in the early 20th century, oil has been both the fulcrum and the nexus of world
geopolitics, dominating warfare, finance, commerce, and industry like no other
commodity or good has done before or since.
However, such dominance has come at a hefty price. The developed world is now
completely dependent upon oil and oil-based products. The result is a dwindling supply
both at home and abroad, despite ever-increasing demand. In fact, with the entrance of
commercially- and industrially awakened China and India, there is simply not enough oil
to keep up with the exploding demand of so many major consumers.
Enter natural gas. Long an alternative of oil, natural gas has nevertheless
remained less than ideal for a number of reasons. However, the desirability of natural gas
has increased as the price of oil has steadily increased, and will continue to do so. This
increase in demand has driven, and will continue to drive, new development in
exploration and production as time moves forward.

3

2.1.1 Declining Worldwide Oil Production
Many energy commentators, beginning with L. King Hubbard over 50 years ago,
have predicted the coming of Peak Oil. 3 Tony Eriksen, a commentator on the Peak Oil
phenomenon, estimates that the world has already reached peak production. According to
him, ―[w]orld production peaked in 2008 at 81.73 million barrels/day (mbd).‖ 4
While few deny the existence of Peak Oil,5 opinions vary as to the real
importance of it and the gravity of the situation. However, the Peak Oil debate illustrates
the tangible pressure within the market to move away from oil as the primary fuel for the
United States‘ economy, whether due to the reality of Peak Oil as a real problem or as
part of the natural innovation process away from oil as a primary fuel. While it remains
unlikely that such a shift will occur abruptly, this increasing pressure will prompt more

Peak oil is a concept that originated with the now-deceased M. King Hubbert, an
American geophysicist who worked for Shell Oil Company. His aggregate
production/depletion curve, known commonly as the Hubbert curve, was based on the
now widely accepted premise that world oil supply is finite. With it, he correctly
predicted peak production in the United States.
4
Eriksen continues in his discussion of world peak oil: ―This oil definition includes crude
oil, lease condensate, oil sands and natural gas plant liquids. If natural gas plant liquids
are excluded, then the production peak remains in 2008 but at 73.79 mbd. However, if oil
sands are also excluded then crude oil and lease condensate production peaked in 2005 at
72.75 mbd…. Non-OPEC oil production peaked in 2004 and is forecast to decline at a
faster rate in 2009 and beyond due mainly to big declines from Russia, Norway, the UK
and Mexico. OPEC has the ability to increase production later this year and in early 2010.
Although key OPEC producer Saudi Arabia peaked in 2005, it probably has sustainable
annual surplus capacity of 1mbd. Iraq and possibly Nigeria also have potential to increase
production but these countries continue to have serious internal conflicts. By the time
2011 arrives, OPEC will not have the ability to offset cumulative non-OPEC declines and
world oil production is forecast to stay below its 2008 peak‖ (Eriksen).
5
The primary exception to this acceptance of the existence of peak oil resides in the
debate over the existence of abiotic, or abiogenic, oil production. This theory, originally
German in origin, gained considerable renown in Russia, particularly under the Soviet
Union, as a result of writings by Dmitri Mendeleev and a number of subsequent Soviet
geologists. The theory has generally fallen out of favor, particularly in the West, due to
the theory‘s inability to predict locations of new oil deposits.
3

4

development in natural gas production worldwide. This can already be witnessed in
China, as the country has recently begun preliminary planning and development of its
own shale gas resources (―China‖), in partnership with American companies and the US
government (―US-China‖). The resulting shift will likely cause increased pressure and
price volatility in natural gas prices due to newer and potentially cheaper-to-develop gas
deposits coming online. This translates to greater budgetary and economic pressures
elsewhere, particularly in places that rely heavily on royalties or revenues from natural
gas extraction.
2.1.2 Unconventional Natural Gas Boom in the United States
The gas industry has taken a keen interest in shale gas formations for a number of
reasons. The advent of directional drilling (also known as horizontal drilling)6 and
hydraulic fracturing (more commonly referred to as hydro-fracking, or fracking) have
made natural gas extraction from shale rock formations economically viable. As a result,
costs of extracting the natural gas have plummeted relative to other unconventional
natural gas plays7 like tight gas, coal-bed methane, and undersea methane hydrate
deposits.
The second development relates to the price of natural gas. As it has risen
over the past few years (despite its recent hovering in the mid-single digits in
6

Directional drilling ―involves steering a downhole drill bit in a direction other
than vertical. An initially vertical drillhole is slowly turned 90 degrees to
penetrate long horizontal distances, sometimes over a mile, through… bedrock.
Hydraulic fractures are then created into the rock at intervals from the horizontal
section of the borehole, allowing a substantial number of high-permeability
pathways to contact a large volume of rock‖ (Soeder and Kappel ―Updated‖).
7
A play is defined as either ―the extent of a petroleum-bearing formation‖ or ―the
activities associated with petroleum development in an area‖ (―Natural Gas Play
Definition‖); though it is used in both oil and gas industries.

5

dollar terms per contract), the overall financial viability and profitability of
unconventional gas development has increased. Because the wellhead prices of
gas have risen ―from values of less than $2.00 per MCF (thousand cubic feet) in
the 1980s to a peak of $10.82 per MCF in the summer of 2008‖ (―EIA – Natural
Gas Pipeline Network‖), it is now financially feasible to expect a return on the
capital investment needed for unconventional gas development. Even with the
decline in prices due to the 2009 economic downturn, they are still substantially
higher than a decade earlier (Soeder and Kappel ―Water Resources‖).
The energy market in the United States has already witnessed substantial
unconventional gas development in both shale gas (the Barnett and Haynesville
plays are the most mature8) and coal bed methane (the Powder River Basin 9 is by
far the largest in the United States) relative to the rest of the world. This trend
simply reflects the overall international trends, as the popularity of
unconventional gas development increases, particularly in Europe and China.
2.1.3 United States as Net Natural Gas Exporter
Until recently, the Canadian natural gas industry, as well as the natural gas
industry at large, had been gearing up for the projected increase in the importation of
natural gas into the United States. Most observers had been predicting a gradual but
sustained move away from oil and toward natural gas for many uses in the U.S., along
with steady but substantial increases in demand of natural gas as a bridging fuel that such
a shift would likely entail. These projections were due in large part to the
8

The Barnett shale formation is located in north-central Texas and the Haynesville shale
formation in northwest Louisiana/east Texas. More information about both formations is
discussed later on in this section.
9
The Powder River Basin is located in southeast Montana and northeast Wyoming.
6

acknowledgement that the U.S. conventional natural gas production had already peaked
as of 2001 (Gilardoni), as well as a dearth of economically viable replacement supply to
make up the difference.
For the foreseeable future, natural gas will be a key energy source for the
developed and developing world. This is already the case for Europe. According to one
source, between 60% and 90% Europe‘s natural needs must be imported from nonEuropean nations, particularly Russia. Unlike Europe, which has considerably fewer and
poorer sources of conventional natural gas, as well as smaller and less-developed
unconventional natural gas plays, the US could conceivably become a net exporter of
natural gas.
To that point, the Kitimat Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facility had originally been
tasked as an import point for LNG into North America – particularly for markets in the
U.S. However, since that time technology has progressed to the point that ―[t]he
Department of Energy now predicts that shale gas could meet half America‘s demand
within two decades and turn the country into a net exporter‖ (Fortson). As a result,
Kitimat is being refitted as an export facility (Vanderklippe). This new development,
something as simple as re-tasking a LNG facility from importing to exporting, signals a
sea change in the future of North American natural gas production, and the world natural
gas market as a whole.
The potential for continued linkage between oil and gas should be of grave
concern for any policymaker basing his or her budgetary projections upon proceeds
related to the market price of natural gas.

7

2.1.4 The Role of Natural Gas in Future United States’ Energy Needs
Oil has clearly dominated the energy markets of the world for decades. Indeed, oil
will likely continue to do so for much of the foreseeable future. However, that dominance
of the world energy markets will be for slightly different reasons moving forward than it
has been in the past. Until now, oil has dominated the world energy markets as a direct
result of how plentiful, fungible, transportable, and relatively cheap it has remained for
decades. However, oil‘s destructive effect on the energy markets will be a direct result of
oil having become the hydrocarbon of choice the world over (Moors). Due to oil‘s
ubiquity in both energy uses (particularly transportation and industrial uses) and as a
financial commodity in its own right, the price of oil has become considerably more
difficult to predict. Such price volatility will necessitate consumers, where possible, to
change to other, more stably-priced hydrocarbon products, especially for transportation
uses. Despite oil‘s hitherto relative price-inelasticity10 in the transportation market, there
have been signs that such price-inelasticity has rather defined limits, and that those limits
will be reached in the near future.11 Moreover, this view has become more common as
time has gone on, leading many to call for more reliable (and more domestic) supplies of
energy. Dr. Timothy Considine, former professor at the Pennsylvania State University
and now professor at University of Wyoming, states that ―[n]atural gas is widely viewed
as a bridge between the age of oil and the next energy paradigm, perhaps based upon

10

Price elasticity of demand refers to the responsiveness of aggregate demand to changes
in price when all other factors are held constant.
11
This was witnessed when gasoline prices reached $4-$5/gallon in 2008. The effect of
this price point seemed to carry a ―psychological effect‖ that numerous economists and
observers noted at the time. As prices approach, and in some areas surpass this price
point again, some predict a similar chilling effect on the overall economy again. The
debate is still open as to whether this will occur or not (Gelsi).
8

some combination of nuclear, solar, wind, and biomass resources…. By developing
domestic natural gas resources here in the United States, greater energy import
dependency and higher trade deficits could be avoided. Liquid fuel imports also could be
displaced if these new natural gas resources could be utilized in transportation‖
(Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 2).
2.1.5 Positive Effects of Natural Resource Development
According to the 2009 Considine report, ―An Emerging Giant: Prospects and
Economic Impacts of Developing the Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Play,‖ Pennsylvania
has already begun to experience benefits that are merely the beginning of greater
improvements on the horizon. Considine noted that Pennsylvanians should expect
substantial increases in employment across numerous sectors of the economy, as well as
substantial increases in net tax inflows. Considering the hemorrhaging of jobs that
Pennsylvania has experienced since most of its heavy industry left several decades ago
(steel, iron, coke, etc.), development of the MSF is seen as a panacea to local and state
policymakers. Both the remittance of funds generated by the pending severance tax on
gas extraction and the increase in industry, commerce, and employment due to the MSF
development will vastly improve Pennsylvania‘s economy.
The basis of the state‘s optimistic outlook with respect to the Marcellus – centered
on economic benefits, taxes and jobs – correctly indicate a critical piece of understanding
regarding shale development. While some benefits will be felt primarily on the local
level, particularly the increase in employment, the overall benefits will tend to more
generally apply themselves throughout the state. Philadelphia, for example, will

9

undoubtedly enjoy many of the positive externalities 12 of the MSF development despite
having no shale beneath it and as a result remaining relatively unscathed by the local
problems with development.13
The 2009 Considine report, as well as the subsequent report published in
2010, are supportive of MSF development and its benefits to Pennsylvania and
urge caution with potentially short-sighted taxation or regulation. According to
Considine, natural gas development is a highly competitive industry that is
extremely vulnerable to natural gas volatility. This has been seen in the Barnett,
particularly from 2008 onward, when new well-drilling activity peaked.
Considine‘s report recommended that Pennsylvania should minimize both
taxation and regulation so as to maximize economic activity stemming from
Marcellus development. That report contends that a ―larger industry in the long
run will be a far greater generator of government tax revenues than an industry
stunted by high taxes or costly regulations‖ (Considine et al. ―An Emerging
Giant‖ 3). While these authors are promoting an extremely industry-friendly
environment, a long-term view is needed so as to not have companies dictate
terms to governments or the general population. The aim of economic policy from
the standpoint of a state (or national) government should focus on sustainable

12

Some of these positive externalities may be in the form of potentially lower natural gas
prices and greater business activity resulting from those lower prices. The potentially
lower prices will be the result of proximity to supply, as well as being part of the
northeast U.S. corridor. Most of the natural gas from Marcellus development will likely
be piped east to fulfill demand from New York City to Washington, D.C.
13
It should be noted that while Philadelphia will likely be relatively negatively affected
by shale gas development, this should not imply that the eastern reaches of the state will
be completely unscathed. Refer to the discussion of watershed and eco-tourism later in
the work.
10

growth, rather than promoting the type of boom and-bust cycles that tend to
eviscerate the economic viability of other industries at the expense of an
extractive one. Considine‘s point above makes it clear that such negative
attendant effects rarely receive any attention. From the extant literature, few
researchers have addressed the possibility that a state within a larger nation might
not benefit from extractive industry.
There are a number of reasons why the positive economic effects of development
are generally addressed more often by researchers. One of the biggest reasons is that
positive economic factors of MSF development tend to be easier to study. There tends to
be a considerable amount of data available for such research. One example can be found
in the following quotation from the 2009 Considine report:
A more meaningful estimate of economic impacts is value added, which
subtracts inter-industry purchases from gross output and measures the
returns to labor and capital. Using this measure, the Marcellus gas industry
in Pennsylvania directly added $1.1 billion to the economy of
Pennsylvania, which then generated indirect and induced impacts that
increased the total value added generated in the Commonwealth by $2.3
billion. In other words, the total economic impact of the Marcellus
industry measured by valued added was $2.3 billion during calendar year
2008 (Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 24).
Without doubt, the development of the MSF will create many economic winners, as has
already been witnessed in places like Washington and Bradford counties, 14 where the
bulk of development in Pennsylvania has occurred thus far.

14

Washington and Bradford Counties have been the early epicenters of Marcellus shale
development, particularly in Pennsylvania. Washington County is located southwest of
Pittsburgh, on the border with West Virginia. The county seat of Washington County,
Washington, PA, is approximately equidistant between Pittsburgh, PA and Wheeling,
WV (―Washington County‖). Bradford County is located along the northern border of
Pennsylvania with New York State. Its county seat is Towanda, PA, which is located
almost due south of Sayre, PA (―Welcome to Bradford County‖).
11

Many of the so-called ―winners‖ of Marcellus shale development have been
farmers and landowners, many of whom have struggled for decades to simply tread
financial water to avoid insolvency and bank repossession of their farmlands. Through
royalty payments and leasing proceeds, many of these people have managed to turn tidy
profits and become relatively well-off, particularly when compared to their neighbors.
Thanks to the experiences of these landowners, as well as published studies both by
academia (Considine‘s work exemplifies this) and industry in general, 15 the case for
developing MSF quickly has been made very strongly. Little attention has been paid to
the likely negative economic externalities associated with MSF development.
2.1.6 The Negative Effects of Development
As natural gas is extracted from the MSF, the state of Pennsylvania will begin to
become more and more dependent upon revenue and economic activity directly resulting
from resource extraction. Table 1 addresses these issues.

15

Range Resources, in particular, has been at the forefront of putting a positive spin on
the Marcellus development. This has been aided greatly by the efforts of the Marcellus
Shale Coalition, essentially an industry front-group that has effectively lobbied to both
maximize shale gas development as well as minimizing regulation and taxation. More
information can be found on their website (―Marcellus Shale Coalition‖) as well as an
opposing website (―Marcellus Shale Coalition – Source Watch‖).

12

Table 1. Potential Policy Issues Related to Resource Extraction

Few if any of the above problems solely affect a single subject. Oftentimes, these
effects can be difficult to unpack or disentangle from one another, as they may present
sympathetic or mutually enabling problems or synergistic relationships that worsen the
overall negative effects. Indeed, only by addressing them all at once can policymakers
hope to truly and effectively mitigate the negative attendant effects of natural resource
extraction.
2.1.6.1 Negative Environmental Externalities
Hydrocarbon development of all types inexorably leads to water pollution. The
flowback water16 from the shale gas drilling will potentially contain a number of potential
16

―Flowback water (aka backflow water) is the murky, salty water from fracking natural
gas wells. It consists of frac fluid which returns to the surface (aka the frac load
recovery) as well as produced water. This water contains clay, dirt, metals, chemicals and
even diesel that may have been added‖ (―Flowback water‖).
13

pollutants, including but not limited to salts, sand, acids (hydrochloric, sulfuric),
bromides, thorium, uranium, radium, sulfides, pyrite, chlorides, zinc, chromium,
molybdenum, cobalt, arsenic, vanadium, nickel, chromium, barium, calcium, iron,
magnesium, manganese, and strontium, and calcium carbonate (CaCO3).17 Any of these
substances can prove to be deadly in their own right. The Dunkard Creek fish kill of
200918, for example, demonstrates the potential for a single moderate to large spill to
impact the environment. However, the state Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) can, in theory, mitigate this damage.
Generally, well-site spillage has traditionally represented the greatest source of
water pollution in shale gas drilling. However, the state has already begun to take
regulatory and oversight action to curb spillage pollution. In this way, DEP is currently
addressing the largest and most obvious point sources of groundwater pollution. 19
However, this leaves another source of environmental pollution unaddressed.
The long-term effects of fracking remain a bit of a mystery, even to geo-physicists
and geologists. No one is completely sure what a frack actually does, short of creating
17

The Democratic members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce recently
released a report that identifies many of the chemicals found in fracwater (―Chemicals‖).
18
Dunkard Creek, which straddles the Pennsylvania/West Virginia border, experienced a
massive fish kill in September 2009 along thirty miles of its length. Golden algae
bloomed in the creek as a result of ―low, warm creek flows and high levels of chlorides
and dissolved solids…[which] were high because of discharges from a mine treatment
facility at Consol Energy's Blacksville No. 2 deep mine and a second treatment facility at
Consol's Loveridge deep mine near the West Virginia town of St. Leo. Another
contributing cause… could be what [was] described as a discharge from a new borehole
into which an unspecified company is injecting drilling wastewater into a mine void‖
(Hopey).
19
One of the major environmental issues that should be addressed more directly is the
interstate/cross-border effect of shale gas development. This is a particularly salient issue
in light of New York State‘s moratorium on new shale gas development, and West
Virginia‘s and Ohio‘s relative lack of development when compared to the development in
Pennsylvania.
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micro-fissures within the underlying shale formation, thereby releasing the captured gas.
The development of fracking technology and the use of this technique in the field have
led to numerous problems, such as micro-earthquakes20, destruction and adulteration of
underground aquifers and groundwater, and water pollution in the form of flowback
water and spillage. Even without these specific problems, the development is considered
heavy industry, and there is generally a localized resultant destruction and degradation of
transportation infrastructure and noise pollution, as well as a considerably greater volume
of traffic. All of these issues either directly or indirectly affect the localities where the
development occurs. Then there are the economic problems, which can lead to such
issues as an overall loss of jobs (mostly in completely unrelated sectors), skilled labor
shortages, and slower overall economic growth. 21
2.1.6.2 Infrastructure Degradation
The development of practically any extractive industry dramatically increases the
load that local infrastructure must bear. Shale gas development is not an exception. The
equipment necessary to drill and frack the formation, water transport trucks for the initial
fracking process, and the trucks necessary for subsequent disposal of the effluent water
must make seemingly countless trips at each drilling location. This greatly increased
traffic leads directly to accelerated road degradation. It does so rather quickly because

20

Hydrofrack-induced micro-earthquakes have been noted since at least as far back as
1982 (Keppler et al.). More recent anecdotal evidence (―Fracking‖) refers to considerably
more frequent micro-quakes. Another, more official, record can be found at a site
maintained by the Arkansas Geological Survey (AGS) (―Earthquakes‖).
21
The problems mentioned here generally are considered to be associated with Dutch
disease/resource curse phenomena. These issues are discussed in greater detail later in
this work.
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most drills are located in rural areas and those local roads were not generally designed to
service heavy industry traffic. 22
2.1.6.3 Commodity Price Volatility
When nations or states base their budgets upon the vagaries of the commodities
markets, the result is generally rather predictable. As Tsalik and Ebel tersely point out,
―Price volatility makes budget planning difficult‖ (Tsalik and Ebel 5). When a
government expands services based on expanded revenues from higher commodity
prices, the budget rarely takes into account the inevitable revenue decline. The result
generally leads to a subsequent elimination or curtailing of the originally expanded
service (ibid). This can lead to all manner of political and economic difficulties.
Between the volatility of the actual price of natural gas and competition from both
domestic and foreign sources of natural gas, governments in natural gas producing areas
will come under dramatic pressures with which the policymakers there have little, if any,
experience.
2.1.6.4 Resource curse/Dutch Disease
Another troublesome problem that resource-extraction-dependent states and
nations suffer has become known by a number of monikers, some referring to the entire
problem, and others referring to a small portion thereof. While contemporary scholarship
identifies both ‗resource curse‘ and ‗Dutch Disease‘ as slightly different manifestations
of the same problem, the two terms can be used interchangeably in most cases.
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This phenomenon will be discussed in considerably greater detail later in the work.
Two locally maintained websites address this problem specifically (―Chesapeake,‖ ―Road
Damage‖).
16

The Dutch Disease has been studied at considerable lengths in recent years. The
term Dutch Disease refers to a phenomenon first observed in Holland that resulted from
the discovery of natural gas in the 1960s (Tsalik and Ebel 5-6). The Dutch Disease occurs
as a direct result of the development of extractive industries, which tends create inflows
of hard currency into the economy in question as the natural resources flow outward. This
hard currency influx tends to stimulate various problems related to foreign exchange
rates, particularly as this hard currency is converted into the local currency, essentially
raising the value of that domestic currency. This inflationary effect tends to increase the
real cost of producing tradable goods, resulting in less competitive pricing vis-à-vis
cheaper foreign goods. This affects both the domestic and foreign markets. As sales
decline in the home economy, labor-intensive, mature industries and economic sectors
tend to decline, leading to unemployment and increased dependence upon natural
resource development. This can have highly destructive effects upon both the domestic
economy as well as upon the public sector, particularly governments highly dependent
upon tax revenue for service provision.
While this explanation of the phenomenon seems to focus mostly upon nationstates, the mechanism remains the same for smaller administrative units within nations,
such as American states. For areas that have been extremely hard-hit in the past by
deindustrialization, this economic phenomenon must be taken very seriously. As Tsalik
and Ebel point out, a great many studies have determined that relatively resource-poor
countries tend to have stronger growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita than
countries blessed with natural resource abundance. They go on to note that this disparity
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in GDP growth per capita actually tends to increase as the price of the commodity in
question increases. 23
Perhaps most important in Tsalik and Ebel‘s work is their recognition that
suffering from the Dutch Disease does not necessarily represent a foregone conclusion
for resource-extractive economies. ―Countries like Botswana, Indonesia, and Malaysia
have managed to improve development while diversifying their economies from
excessive reliance on natural resources (Tsalik and Ebel 7). NRFs seem to be a viable
policy option for the negative effects of resource extraction-based economies.
Until now, research on the Dutch Disease has been limited to considering its
effects upon entire nations, particularly developing nations. 24 While some have also
considered developed nations, particularly Norway, none consider the potential effects of
the Dutch Disease on political or administrative subdivisions within a nation-state, whose
economies rely heavily on resource extraction. Part of the aim of this work will be to
address that issue directly.
One of the main reasons Dutch Disease research has been limited to considering
only nation-states is due in part to the fact that the Dutch Disease is thought to be
primarily an affliction stemming largely from hard currency-related inflation. The US
economy in particular is also thought to be large enough to stave off the effects of the
Dutch Disease by absorbing the potential for currency devaluation and smoothing the
negative effects for individual states. While both statements are true, there are some
23

Tsalik and Ebel specifically discuss oil in this particular situation, noting that between
1960 and 1990, countries with comparatively little oil wealth tended to grow at rates
ranging from double to triple rates experienced by comparatively oil-rich nations (Tsalik
and Ebel 3).
24
Norway, Russia, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Botswana, and Brazil, among others, are primary
subjects of study (Wright and Czelusta).
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problems with this perspective. First, currency devaluation is only one characteristic of
the Dutch Disease. Indeed, once could argue that the sectoral and localized inflation
generally experienced in conjunction with the Dutch Disease always exists in some
capacity in resource-extraction-dependent economies. Certain political or financial
realities specific to each individual economy serves to exacerbate or mitigate the effects.
In this way, the states in the US that base a large portion of their economies of resource
extraction benefit from being part of a large, diversified economy. However, while the
economy of the nation may be diversified, the local and regional economies tend to be
less so. The so-called ―Rust Belt‖ cities are a case in point. Despite the fact that many of
these areas were areas of high industrialization, the fact of the matter remains that these
areas tended to be, nonetheless, rather one-dimensional and almost as vulnerable to these
Dutch Disease effects as regions that rely solely on extractive development. The degree
to which a given economy is dependent upon an industry – extractive or otherwise –
determines to a great degree how strong a case of the Dutch Disease that economy could
―catch.‖
The existence of a legitimate, democratic political system likewise lessens the
difficulties related to corruption most nations, particularly developing nations, tend to
experience. Overall, countries with good institutions are more likely to benefit from the
economic blessing and less likely to suffer from the political curse (Cotet and Tsui).
While Cotet and Tsui are correct on this point, they challenge the existence and power of
the Dutch Disease by treating entire countries as uniform entities without regional
differences that could their positions. While the resource curse assumes the existence of a
resource is an economic blessing (Cotet and Tsui 491), this presumption should be

19

conditionalized. While the resource represents substantial wealth, the questions of how
those resources, the rents, and royalties are allocated, as well as how quickly those
resources are developed and extracted must also be addressed. In this way, in addition to
being an economic boon, natural resources can likewise be an economic curse.
2.1.6.5 Micro-Inflation/ Sectoral Inflation
Just as resource extraction industries can have substantially negative effects on
macro-level economic issues in a given economy, such industries can also negatively
affect micro-level concerns. Of particular concern are micro-inflation and sectoral
inflation, two sides to a common problem.
Just as inflation is a result of increased economic activity (oftentimes seen in
economies in which there have been substantial injections of currency, or when the
velocity of money increases, or both), micro-inflation is the phenomenon of increased
economic activity on the very local level. While rarely a concern for most economists,
micro-inflation can create public policy complications with profound long-term
outcomes.
Housing rents, for example, tend to be one of the most sensitive indicators of
micro-inflation resulting from faster economic development. When more work has been
created – when a given natural resource begins to be developed – new workers are often
needed in order to provide the requisite labor force necessary to successfully develop the
play. This need for additional manpower often necessitates the importation of outside
labor, particularly for the types of highly specialized jobs required for such industries as
natural gas development. These new workers require shelter, and oftentimes the
employers of these workers are willing to pay a premium for such housing. This
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additional demand created by the new non-indigenous labor, as well as the premium that
may well be paid for housing, has the effect of driving prices up, putting the squeeze on
local citizens. If the overall wages and income remain stagnant or growth trails behind
the increases in costs for housing, the end result can be tremendous pressure upon the
indigenous population.25
This mechanism functions with particular power on necessities, such as food,
water, shelter, clothing, etc., that have traditionally high price inelasticity. The net public
policy result if these issues are not addressed will likely be angry or beleaguered citizens.
The flip-side to micro-inflation is sectoral inflation. Sectoral inflation is an
economic phenomenon that occurs when development in a particular sector of the
economy forces the prices of goods upward. Sectoral inflation essentially manifests as a
location non-specific supply-side version of micro-inflation. The mechanism looks very
similar, but the results can be even more detrimental to an economy, as the effects tend to
be more persistent and more difficult to rectify after the fact.
Specialized labor shortages represent a good general example of sectoral inflation.
When specialized labor becomes necessary for a new and fast-growing industry to
succeed, the new demand places upward pressure on the local (or even regional) labor
costs, putting pressure upon more mature industries with considerably more stable and
relatively fixed profit margins. By forcing the cost of labor inputs upward, it becomes
more difficult for those mature industries and firms to retain the necessary specialized
labor without trying to compete for those laborers. The net result can easily be the
25

Because of the nature of such short time horizon boom/bust cycles, public policy
responses tend to be muted or nonexistent. This lack of response can create or exacerbate
additional pressures and social impacts upon localities and their citizens, particularly on
low-income or homeless people.
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contraction of these more mature industries, leading to a general de-industrialization or
de-commercialization of the affected area.26
While labor certainly represents the most visible example of sectoral inflation, it
certainly does not hold a monopoly on being affected by it. Practically any input for
supply at any point within the supply chain can fall victim to sectoral inflation. The more
similar the skills or inputs of the resource extractive industry to other industries, the more
severe the effects on the more mature industry will be.
Indeed, there already exists ample reason for concern about the above inflationbased issues. ―Expenditures at all stages of production generate indirect economic
impacts as the initial stimulus from expenditures on natural gas development is spent and
re-spent in other business sectors of the economy‖ (Considine et al. The Economic
Impacts 18). Considine admits that there will be substantial impacts on the economy,
locally, regionally, and nationally. However, he fails to acknowledge the potential harm
these impacts will have upon the economy, either at the macro- or the micro- levels:
[T]he construction of supporting infrastructure is a very significant
undertaking that requires thousands of suppliers of steel, machines, and
equipment. These suppliers would have to ramp-up to meet this new
demand by hiring thousands of workers, often in relatively high paying
manufacturing and construction jobs. Pennsylvania experienced such an
industrial boom during the last half of the 19th century, leaving behind vast
wealth that underpins great institutions, such as Carnegie Mellon
University, which generate benefits for citizens today (Considine et al.
―An Emerging Giant‖ 6).

26

Richter‘s article in Foreign Affairs discusses the Fed‘s role in tamping down inflation
concerns as well as the effect immigration tends to have in assisting in such policy
concerns. It should be noted that labor inflation has been a chief concern informing
Federal Reserve policy dating back to Volcker‘s term, and particularly under the
chairmanship of Alan Greenspan (Richter).
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While the actual net effects of this development remain unclear at present, the overall net
result will likely fall well short of the panacea that many boosters of shale gas
development.
Similarly, as the demand for steel pipe increases with the continuing development
of the MSF, the price for steel pipe (and steel as well) will rise, affecting other sectors of
the economy. This type of inflation can have dramatic and negative effects upon other
industries within an economy, depressing overall economic activity despite the increase
in economic activity in the sector that initially created the sectoral inflation. Not only
could sectoral inflation exacerbate a recession if it occurs during one, it could potentially
be the root cause of a recession, particularly on a local or regional level. Considine makes
a point to establish the level of economic growth that would result in the development of
the MSF.
The Marcellus industry purchases of goods and services, their royalties to
landowners, and tax payments directly create more than 14,000 jobs in
Pennsylvania. Indirect and induced impacts create even more jobs so that
total jobs created by the Marcellus industry is estimated at 29,284…. The
results of this study indicate that for every $1 million of output created by
natural gas in the Pennsylvania Marcellus, 6.9 jobs are created (Considine
et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 25).
Such a dramatic expansion in one particular sector of the economy could easily produce
negative side effects for numerous other industries.
2.1.7 Mitigating Negative Externalities
Policymakers tend to fall into two categories in response to negative externalities.
On the one hand are the laissez-faire policymakers who tend to put considerable faith in
the power of the market to mitigate or rectify market failures or pressures that will affect
citizens. On the other hand, some policymakers take a more active approach, concerning
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themselves with the immediate welfare of citizens. For those policymakers who tend to
take a more active role, there exist a number of policy responses. Two of the most
popular, and most effective, are severance taxes and NRFs.
2.1.7.1 Severance Tax
Severance taxes27 provide the opportunity to mitigate issues that may arise as a
result of natural resource extraction. Thirty-five states in the US have already instituted
some form of resource extraction severance tax,28 as well as many nations.29 These taxes
can be as general or specific as the imposing government chooses, both from the
standpoint of how specifically the tax can be assessed and how the proceeds of the tax is
spent. For the most part, states that have severance taxes on extractive industries choose
to funnel most of those royalties into their general fund. West Virginia and Alaska are
notable exceptions.30 Much of that state‘s severance tax revenue gets spent on
environmental remediation efforts for coal-related environmental destruction. The
27

Severance taxes are defined as ―a tax levied by a state on the extractor of oil, gas, or
minerals intended for consumption in other states‖ (―Severance tax‖).
28
A list of U.S. states that have adopted severance taxes is included later in this work.
29
Nations that have instituted natural resource funds tend to use some form of severance
tax to provide revenue for their NRFs.
30
Fifteen U.S. states remit a portion of severance royalties back to localities. Those states
include the following: Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Ten states set aside, as a matter of law, a percentage of the
severance taxes collected for environmental remediation and for additional conservation
efforts. These states include the following: California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana,
Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Most states
choose to fund these allocations as expenditures in the general fund, making them subject
to the normal political process, whereas a small handful (Alaska, New Mexico, and
Wyoming) use a separate fund, much like numerous nation-states have chosen to do. This
policy option serves essentially to insulate the funding of those policies from many, if not
all, political conflicts. Alaska also uses the proceeds of its severance taxes to both fund its
NRF as well as provide what amounts to a pension to every citizen of the state. West
Virginia employs a large portion of their collected severance proceeds for a number of
uses, including environmental remediation (―Shared Costs‖).
24

following three tables illustrate how complicated the process of comparison can be when
considering the severance tax regimes of various states. States use a variety of different
calculation methods. This obviously does not lend itself easily to comparison. Table 2
provides a list of all states with current severance taxes, the amount of revenue those
severance taxes provide to their respective states, and the percentage of the total state
revenue the respective severance taxes make up. Table 3 shows the specific severance tax
structures for the top 15 state natural gas producers in the US. Table 4 lists states with
any sort of natural resource severance taxes and the resources upon which those taxes are
levied.
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Table 2. State Severance Tax Collections by State (thousands of dollars)31

31

Total taxes include: property tax, general sales and gross receipts, motor fuel sales
taxes, alcoholic beverages, public utilities, insurance, tobacco products, pari-mutuels,
amusements, other selective sales and gross receipts, alcoholic beverages, public utilities,
motor vehicles, motor vehicle operator, corporations in general, hunting and fishing
licenses, occupation and business licenses, other licenses taxes, individual income taxes,
corporation net income taxes, death and gift taxes, severance taxes, documentary and
stock transfer taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes.
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Table 3. Severance Tax Rates and Corporate Taxes in the Top 15 Natural Gas Producing States
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Table 4. States with Severance Taxes
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Table 4 (continued). States with Severance Taxes
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2.1.7.1.1 Use of Severance Tax Revenue
When the proceeds of a severance tax are placed directly into the general fund, it
can create substantial incentives on the part of policymakers to spend the new money.
Aside from the obvious profligacy of such behavior, other problems can arise. In brief,
32

The leap in crude oil prices recently has had a noticeable effect on state severance tax
collections reported to the Census Bureau. In 16 states, severance taxes accounted for at
least 1 percent of state tax collections in 2007, with Alaska leading the pack (Zelio and
Houlihan).
29

such spending can exacerbate general, localized, and sectoral inflation, it can exhaust the
compensation for the sale of a given state‘s patrimony, and the money can create a more
onerous social spending burden which, when the source of new revenue potentially dries
up in the future, can inadvertently cause contraction or cessation of services upon which
citizens have come to rely.
2.1.7.1.2 Severance Taxes as Economic “Brakes”
The imposition of some form of severance tax upon the Marcellus development
may or may not dramatically impair economic development in Pennsylvania. If the
Considine reports are to be believed, there may be a reduction in how quickly the
Marcellus will be developed. While this debate is still ongoing, the imposition of a
severance tax will not prevent development of the MSF in Pennsylvania, as has been seen
in all other states with oil and gas development. Pennsylvania is the only state with
appreciable oil or gas production that has not imposed some form of severance on
extraction. The fact that development has proceeded everywhere else in the US with the
presence of a severance tax undermines the argument against a severance tax.
While the severance tax may reduce the rate of development (particularly if
Considine‘s report is correct), this may be a more prudent long-term strategy. As that
report states:
[T]his [severance] tax cannot be passed on to consumers and, therefore,
drilling activity would decline by more than 30 percent and result in an
estimated $880 million net loss in the present value of tax revenue
between now and 2020. Severance tax revenue gains are more than offset
by declining state and local income taxes resulting from lower drilling
activity under the severance tax. The high level of drilling activity in
Pennsylvania is a function of relatively lower taxes. This competitive
advantage should be maintained as the Marcellus competes for capital and
labor with other shale plays around the nation. Imposing a severance tax at
this early stage of development could significantly inhibit the growth of
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the Marcellus gas industry in Pennsylvania (Considine et al. ―An
Emerging Giant‖ ii).33
One of the main problems with the resource curse is the rate of development vis-à-vis the
rest of the economy. This is highly dependent upon the overall price of gas, specifically
the Henry Hub34 price and including any royalty and extraction taxes. This is important to
note, since a severance tax amounts to what is essentially an additional production cost
directly to the natural gas industry. 35 This is because these costs cannot be passed on to
the end user, thanks to the competitive nature of the gas market at large. If the imposition
of the severance tax could potentially temper the exuberance with which gas extraction
companies rush into the MSF, conceivably much of the pain associated with natural
resource extraction could be minimized to some degree. This reduction in development
would be a short-term development. Since the price of natural gas is likely to both
33

To elaborate, Considine‘s argument against imposing a severance tax is based on the
assumption that Marcellus development in Pennsylvania should occur as quickly as
possible in order to maximize the potential economic benefits. However, as the literature
that addresses the Dutch Disease emphasizes, the speed at which resource extraction
occurs can have dramatic effects upon the sectoral and locality-based externalities.
Therefore, if the aim of Pennsylvania lawmakers is to create a sustainable model of
development that both allows for resource extraction and aims to mitigate the works
excesses of Dutch Disease/resource curse externalities, it stands to reason that slowing
down natural gas development may, in fact, be a viable public policy approach. This, of
course, assumes that Considine‘s argument about the potential effects of the imposition
of a severance tax are correct.
34
Henry Hub is the convergence point for a number of major American natural gas
pipelines. When speaking of Henry Hub pricing, this term refers to Henry Hub as the
pricing point basis and official delivery point for American natural gas futures contracts
trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).
35
It is important to note that severance taxes represent but one variable that companies
consider when determining where to develop hydrocarbons (or other extractive
resources). While the argument could be successfully made that, all other variables being
equal, severance tax rates will determine the competitiveness or financial viability of
developing a given resource, rarely – if ever – will that be the case. Once again, this has
been observed in all other states that have oil or gas development. All except
Pennsylvania have imposed severance taxes on the oil and gas industry operating in their
boundaries.
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become more volatile and generally rise as the demand for the fuel rises and the
penetration into the market for more diversified uses increases, it makes sense to curtail
the ramping up of production so that the rents36 of the resource can be maximized. This
would place Pennsylvania in good company with other resource-extractive economies the
world over, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela, 37 among others. Such rentmaximizing behavior (as opposed to profit-maximizing behavior) in the natural gas
market will likely have a similar price-stabilizing effect on the natural gas market as it
does on the oil market. While volatility cannot be eliminated altogether, minimizing it
makes formulating policy considerably easier in the long run.
2.1.7.2 Natural Resource Funds (NRFs)
In the United States, twenty-six states have substantial amounts of resource
extraction-based development.38 Many nations also find themselves in a similar set of
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The term rent refers to the financial return received by the owner of a given property in
excess of the cost of production/maintenance. In this case, rents refer to the return
received from the development of some natural resource (e.g., natural gas, oil) that
exceeds the costs of production for said resource. More commonly, the term is typically
employed in relation to real estate, whereby tenants will pay a set rate for using the
property, and represents return over and above the capital appreciation and the cost of
maintenance for that property.
37
Dag Harald Claes, in his now-famous work ―The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation‖
delves deeply into this subject, making the argument that, with few exceptions – namely
Kuwait – oil-producing nations have an economic incentive to maximize rents rather than
profits. This is due in large part to the fundamental difference between profit-maximizing
corporations, whose main (only?) bottom-line concern is profit-maximization, and the
manifold concerns facing oil-producing nations.
38
There is no standard percentage to which to refer when speaking of substantial levels
of economic activity based upon resource extraction. There are many variables to
consider. For some nations, like Venezuela, rely heavily on extractive industries.
Approximately one-third of Venezuela‘s total GDP, four-fifths of its exports, and more
than half of all government revenues are due to petroleum extraction and associated
industries. On the other hand, approximately one-fifth of Norway‘s GDP and almost half
of total exports is due to oil or natural gas (―CIA World Factbook – Norway,‖ ―CIA
World Factbook – Venezuela,‖ ―Norway,‖ ―Venezuela‖).
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circumstances, with large portions of their overall economy based upon natural resource
extraction. The percentage of a given nation‘s overall economy that is dependant upon
resource extraction can vary greatly, but all of them will be subjected to the
complications of this type of development to some greater or lesser extent.
Many of the problems these states have experienced are microcosms of the issues
facing entire nations that base large portions of their economic activity upon resource
extraction. The states, just as the nations, suffer many ills. Dutch Disease and price
volatility rank high on the list of concerns, just as infrastructure costs, environmental
degradation, and sectoral and micro-inflation do. These states would do well to consider
public policies that many of these nations have chosen to pursue. According to Tsalik and
Ebel, NRFs can be an effective policy mechanism for stabilizing government spending
and revenues, particularly in light of the volatile nature of commodity markets.
Moreover, NSFs can help mitigate complications arising from the Dutch Disease by
―sterilizing‖ royalty revenues by preventing the injection of substantial amounts of export
revenues from entering the domestic economy, thereby preventing the problems arising
from hard-currency-driven inflationary pressures from overheating the economy (Tsalik
and Ebel 6).
Moreover, NRFs can also be employed in multiple ways to serve a multitude of
public policy goals. Typically, NRFs are employed as either stabilization funds or as
future savings funds. Some governments choose to employ NSFs for both purposes.
Stabilization funds can be employed to ―smooth out‖ government expenditures by
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redirecting tax or royalty revenues to the NSF when commodity prices rise, providing a
source of additional revenue for the government in question when resource prices – and
their concomitant revenues – fall (Tsalik and Ebel 18). By providing a mechanism to
divert and invest revenues when commodity prices rise, a given government then has a
fund set aside to reliably fund future policy initiatives, even in a sustained period of low
prices or high price volatility.
Another major concern of governments dependent upon resource extraction is the
prospect of exploiting its citizens‘ patrimony, either through outright profligacy, or
through the natural depletion of a given limited, non-renewable resource. Natural
resources, typically by their very nature, are scarce and non-renewable. By
acknowledging this fact as well as embracing the idea that these depletable resources also
belong to future generations, the establishment of a NSF for use as a savings fund or
―future generations‖ fund can allow for the storing of wealth to be used by future citizens.
By creating a storehouse of wealth and then using that wealth to generate a stream of
income, the NSF operates in much the same way as pensions operate for individuals
(Tsalik and Ebel 18). In addition, by setting aside a portion of the proceeds from the
royalty payments, a given government can protect against the short-term exhaustion of
the resource royalty windfall resulting from extraction.
Many nations around the world,39 as well as the state of Alaska, have instituted
NRFs to better mitigate and manage the attendant effects of resource extraction. Many
have been successful, and some certainly more than others.
2.1.7.2.1 Importance of bringing stakeholders to the table
39

Some examples include Norway, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia (Tsalik and
Ebel).
34

NRFs also provide the potential for bringing stakeholders to the decision-making
table, rather than allowing the decisions for spending those funds to be made without
direct public scrutiny. This allows for consideration of the potential impacts to
stakeholders and their non-financial concerns, such as: environmental, water usage, local
infrastructure degradation, socio-demographic changes, local economic, health and
safety, consumer protection, legal and regulatory effects, local governmental
responsibility, local service demands, etc.40
2.1.8 Boom and Bust Cycles
The modern hydrocarbon era began in Pennsylvania on August 28, 1859, when
―Colonel‖ Edwin Laurentine Drake struck oil outside of Titusville, Pennsylvania (Green).
From those inauspicious beginnings, American and world oil and gas development began
in earnest. Today, Pennsylvania stands at the cusp of yet another hydrocarbon revolution,
one that will move the market from a climate dominated by oil to one dictated by the
supply of natural gas. The original strike in Pennsylvania led to an abrupt boom, and an
even more abrupt bust, leaving many Pennsylvanians in worse shape than before the oil
strike. With Marcellus shale production, the development is promising wealth, jobs,
cheaper energy, greater national energy independence, and a new future for the state.
Yet the history of Titusville still lingers. Many Pennsylvanians seem stricken with
fear of what this new hydrocarbon development might bring – and not without good
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Just because NSFs provide potential for bringing stakeholders to the table, this should
not be mistaken as a guarantee for such interaction. Indeed, much research indicates that
political corruption, perhaps more than any other variable, determines the degree to
which stakeholders can be brought to the policy negotiation table.
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reason. The fruits of this development very well could be as arbitrarily enjoyed as those
from Drake‘s play.
Oil in particular has seen its volatility skyrocket as a direct result of its dual nature
as a commodity and a financial instrument (Moors). As natural gas phases in as another
―dual use‖ resource, it will likely become subject to similar market forces. A quick look
at the general trend over the period from 1989 to 2005 for both natural gas and oil prices
illustrates how the prices of oil and natural gas are related. The following graphical
depiction shows overlays of historical Henry Hub prices with West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) crude prices. 41
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West Texas Intermediate refers to the type and quality of oil historically extracted from
Texas, particularly in the Permian Basin of West Texas. WTI oil has traditionally been of
high quality, exhibiting both relatively low density and low sulfur content. Hence, the use
of the phrase ―light, sweet‖ when referring to oil quality. High-density oil, like what is
typically found in the Orinoco Basin in Venezuela, and sour crude, like what is typically
found in Saudi Arabia, tends to sell at a discount to the benchmark pricing. WTI has been
used as the benchmark for North American crude oil pricing on the NYMEX, whereas
Brent pricing (from the North Sea) is used as the benchmark for European, African, and
Middle Eastern crude oil pricing (―Brent Crude,‖ ―North Sea,‖ ―West Texas Intermediate
(WTI),‖ ―West Texas Intermediate – Wikipedia‖).
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Figure 1. Henry Hub and West Texas Intermediate Prices (1989-2005)

The 1859 Pennsylvania oil strike at Titusville provides us a further a case in point
(―ExplorePAHistory.com‖). While many in Pennsylvania may see the original American
oil strike and subsequent development as a case for considerably stronger environmental
protection, it likewise provides an example of unregulated and unmitigated economic
development which, when not managed properly, leaves an economic wasteland in its
wake. As covered previously, it is clear from the historical record that extractive industry
has a tendency to unleash many uncontrolled and unanticipated forces upon given
localities. Not only did the Titusville strike create vast fortunes and cause horrible
environmental damage, it also wiped out entire towns and populations when the oil dried
up. Such boom-bust industrial development plays havoc with proper policy management,
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and very well could lead to choking off all other surrounding economic activity, even if
that economic activity seemingly has no connection to the extractive industry in question.
In addition, Alaska‘s recent write-down of oil reserve figures provides a more
recent example of the drawbacks of price volatility (Heimel). When a number of oil
companies operating in Alaska wrote down their oil reserve estimates, the state found
itself in the unenviable position of having a large portion of its expected future revenues
from oil extraction evaporate overnight. As a result, Alaska now faces substantial
budgetary and economic crises that will worsen going forward. In this case overly
optimistic estimates were given; but reality has led to a future fund shortfall (Levisohn).
2.1.9 Gas Pricing and Volatility
Aside from the most recent and precipitous drop in world natural gas prices –
which was fundamentally unrelated to the energy markets42 – there has been a sharp and
substantial increase in the overall price of natural gas since 2001. Three major causes for
this boom include demand growth, gas-oil linkage, and speculation.43
There are many factors that help determine natural gas prices. The following is a
list of many of the some of the largest considerations for determining gas prices
(Gilardoni 116-20):
Price seasonality
Cost of production, transportation, storage, and distribution
42

The primary reason for the drop in natural gas prices since 2008 owes more to the
overall world economy – and the subprime mortgage bubble‘s effect on it – than new
natural gas production. Only now is the economy recovering to levels approaching prerecession levels.
43
―These contracts, historically fundamental to investments in infrastructure, are still
very important even though in the last ten years the spot and forward markets have grown
in importance. The structure of these contracts allows a change in prices, with a certain
delay, changes that are very often indexed to oil prices‖ (Gilardoni 6).
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Region/country specificity
Political relationships between parties and nations
Size/type of customer
Contractual structure of supply agreement
Oil linkage
Risk markets and speculation
Regulations
Taxation
Balance of supply and demand
National events
Market expectations
As one can imagine, many of these factors can be either endogenous or
exogenous, depending upon a number of issues. There again, such lack of uniformity in
the gas market – which the expansion of the LNG market and more sustained and
converging gas prices should remedy – makes price volatility a rather major concern,
particularly for policymakers who depend upon revenues and royalties from natural gas
extraction and production.
One of the primary ways in which gas prices are determined is by the market for
natural gas that is established by ―take-or-pay‖ contracts.44
Speculation has a dramatic effect upon natural gas prices for many reasons. For
the purpose of this work, the important point to remember is that, while speculation is
critical to maintaining market liquidity, the speculation itself has a tendency to drive
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Take-or-pay contracts are structured in such a way that the contract purchaser must
either accept the goods under contract, or suffer some pre-contracted penalty.
The importance of these contracts was, of course, seen in the recent diplomatic blow-up,
no pun intended) between Russia and Turkmenistan, when Gazprom essentially refused
to honor the agreed-upon take-or-pay agreements. Mysteriously the pipeline pressure
between the two nations fluctuated slightly, leading to a rather dramatic and coincidental
gas explosion on the border between the two former Soviet republics.
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prices upward. According to some sources, the real effect of speculation may be a net
increase in the price of natural gas of over 30%.45
More important than the amount of speculation is the type of speculation –
enormous bets by non-traditional, e.g., hedge funds and other non-end-users, causes more
market volatility rather than less volatility, as one might expect with an increase in the
volume of speculation.
According to Gilardoni, there are at least two different theories about the
evolution of natural gas prices. The first theory is based on the historical trends of oil
prices, and their tendency to follow a pattern of extended waves, i.e., long-term price
increases followed by long-term price decreases. The second theory is based on the
assumption that changes in hydrocarbon prices are structural in nature, due in large part
to changes in the political relationships between the producing and consuming countries.
The demand for energy will steadily grow, resulting in a constant pressure on supply,
pushing prices ever higher (Gilardoni 8).
Both of these theories carry a fair amount of weight, insofar as they both are
empirically based and describe, to some degree, how the oil and gas markets have
behaved in the past. However, rather than being at odds with one another, these
mechanisms in actuality function in conjunction with one another, for a variety of
reasons. As Moors‘ research into oil volatility and the last three years demonstrates, these
long waves will be punctuated by extreme fluctuations in oil prices – due to oil‘s dual
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―A US Senate investigation demonstrated the negative impact of uncontrolled
speculation by increasing real prices, with damaging consequences for businesses and
families. According to some analysts, although it is very difficult to calculate, the extent
of speculation has grown dramatically in the last five years, reaching levels in excess of
US $100 billion for the US market alone‖ (Gilardoni 6).
40

nature as both a commodity and a financial instrument – and the two trends mentioned
above will serve as mutually reinforcing attributes of the overall energy markets. As this
hyper-volatility compels much of the industrialized world to move into a post-petroleum
scenario, in which the fuel source of choice for electricity production and transportation
will no longer be coal and oil, respectively, one can expect the same rules of volatility to
eventually apply to natural gas as they seem to apply to oil in the current climate. This
volatility, particularly from a budgetary and macroeconomic perspective, must be
addressed directly, otherwise succumbing to the resource curse becomes an ever greater
potential developmental threat.
There can really no longer be talk of domestic energy markets without addressing
their place within the larger context of the world energy market. The respective domestic
markets are becoming ever-more intrinsically linked, and are affected by the goings-on
within other nations and, more importantly, regional markets. Regional markets have
increased in importance due in great part to the lack of a unified world market and lack of
a distribution network like what oil has developed over the past century. This, however,
is changing almost daily. With the adoption of LNG use and production worldwide –
Qatar led the way by turning all of its natural gas production to LNG right before the
recent international economic collapse – soon natural gas will be every bit as fungible,
and considerably more abundant than oil.
Therefore, there is currently no single baseline price for natural gas, and no single
global gas market. Historically, the gas market has been regional and pricing largely
local.
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As Gilardoni notes, the United States in particular led the way developing natural
gas production and usage due mostly to the presence of the largest and most
technologically and financially advanced oil and gas companies on the planet,
specifically ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron (22). Despite the fact that
American conventional gas production peaked somewhere during 2001, American
unconventional gas production has yet to really even begin. This is in addition to the fact
that, despite reaching peak production, the US still maintains substantial conventional
reserves. Thus, just as the US led the way in developing its conventional reserves, so it
likewise leads the world in unconventional development, and also can claim substantial –
albeit not the largest in the world– unconventional reserves in the form of shale gas, tight
gas, coal-bed methane, and methane hydrates. In fact, it is entirely conceivable that total
US natural gas production (conventional and unconventional) will increase well beyond
the levels reached by conventional production only (Gilardoni 22).
The current US ―energy mix,‖ or rather the proportion of energy the US employs
from various sources, has not changed dramatically over the previous thirty years
(Gilardoni 42). However, this will undoubtedly change soon, as new rules recently passed
by Congress will go into effect starting at the beginning of 2012. These new rules will
essentially force the mothballing of a number of coal-fired plants, since retrofitting the
requisite scrubbing technology remains terribly cost-prohibitive, particularly for the older
plants. Some have predicted that natural gas usage will increase substantially in order to
make up the difference in power generation.
Particularly until the gas market can truly be called an international market, one of
the most important single factors determining the price of natural gas is its linkage to oil
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prices (Gilardoni 127). This so-called ―gas-oil linkage‖ is due in large part to the pricing
of take-or-pay contracts for natural gas, which are essentially long-term contracts,
generally between large producers and consumers. These take-or-pay contracts have
historically been based upon oil prices, and generally are agreed upon for periods often in
excess of decades.
While the individual spot markets are beginning to develop into a more
comprehensive system, thanks in large part to more and better sources of LNG, much of
the price of natural gas remains determined by this contract price linkage to oil. In the
intermediate term, while the global natural gas market establishes itself but is still heavily
impacted by oil prices, it will be interesting to see precisely how much the predicted
volatility of oil will affect natural gas prices (Gilardoni 131-2).
2.1.10 Short Term vs. Long Term Production Potential
Another concern related to the development of natural resources, but specific to
shale gas extraction – as well as deepwater oil and gas, and other types of unconventional
gas development – is the comparatively high front-end production of the resource in
question, and the way in which it stands in stark contrast to production in later years. As
much as 60% of the total extractable natural gas volume from a given well will be
extracted within a period of between 18 and 36 months from the initial well spudding
(Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 6). One need only compare the depletion curves
of the examples cited above with those of more ―normal‖ hydrocarbons, such as
conventional natural gas or onshore oil, to get a sense of the problem. Due to the highly
front-end-loaded extraction, many of the potential benefits of shale gas extraction could
easily be mitigated by the negative effects that such development would entail. Therefore,
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policymakers should strongly consider this aspect of shale gas development before
making long-term plans on any number of policies.

2.2 A Changing Landscape: How Pennsylvania’s Resources are Impacted
The MSF will undoubtedly have a profound effect, both positive and negative, on
Pennsylvania. This has been witnessed in other shale gas developments in the U.S.,
particularly in the Barnett and Haynesville formations. It stands to reason that, to some
greater or lesser degree, the development experiences in those places will likely provide
indications as to what will happen moving forward in the Marcellus.
2.2.1 Previous US Shale Gas Development
As noted previously, the MSF development follows the Barnett and Haynesville
formations as major shale gas developments in the United States. Of these two, the
Barnett shale formation (BSF) is the larger and older play. 46 The BSF covers
approximately 5,000 square miles of the north-central part of Texas. Figure 2 shows the
location of the primary production area of the BSF in Texas.
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―Natural gas production from shale deposits began during the 1980s with the
development of the Barnett Shale play in the Fort Worth, Texas region. During 2008 this
field alone produced 3.8 BCF per day. Just five years prior in 2003, it produced 0.8 BCF
per day‖ (Considine et al. ―An Emerging Giant‖ 5).
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Figure 2. Barnett Shale Formation Location Map

Source: The Perryman Group (“Barnett Shale Impact Study”)

Barnett development began in 1981 with the spudding of vertical wells, and
proceeded eventually to the developmental convergence of horizontal drilling and
hydrofracturing into a single process. The Barnett, it has been said, has become the true
―proving ground‖ for economically viable shale gas development (―Shale Gas
Reservoirs‖).
Based on a recent economic impact report on the BSF development published in
2009, ―[t]here are more than 10,500 wells and 222 companies operating in the Barnett
Shale…. In 2008, the Barnett Shale generated 111,131 permanent jobs and pumped more
45

than $11 billion into the regional economy, a net gain of more than 30 percent over the
previous year‖ (Bennett ―Barnett Shale‖).
The well and job data on the BSF provides a conservative starting point for
estimating expected output in the MSF. Considine, Engelder, and Lash, along with most
other analysts dealing with the MSF, have based their estimates of the MSF on the BSF.
Therefore, the BSF, with relatively smaller size and less-rich deposits compared to the
MSF, can give a conservative estimate of what to expect moving forward as development
proceeds in the MSF.
As beneficial as the Barnett (and the Haynesville) development has arguably been
for their respective economies, a more balanced and broader view should be taken when
discussing the more localized conditions and attendant problems there. Whitmer and
Brasier opined that local conditions – particularly economic, environmental, and
infrastructural – will have profound impacts on the exploration and development of
natural gas. Moreover, due to the variations in those conditions between and among
various localities where shale gas development is taking place, the policy options
available to each particular locality will differ considerably (Whitmer and Brasier).
While the development of the MSF will benefit some areas and negatively impact
others, the benefits certainly will not accrue equally or uniformly. Indeed, some areas, or
even entire regions, may receive little if any benefit to the development and experience
many of the negative attendant effects, whereas other areas very well could experience
rather outsized benefits and yet experience few, if any, of the negative externalities. Such
asymmetrical or unfair outcomes necessitate statewide public policy action in such
circumstances.
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2.2.2 Marcellus Shale Specifics
Marcellus shale47 is a type of stratified rock located approximately a mile beneath
the surface of the earth, stretching from southern West Virginia through Ohio and
Pennsylvania into southern New York state. Figure 3 shows the extent of the Marcellus
formation in Pennsylvania.
Figure 3. Marcellus Shale Formation Location Map

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

The shale has a substantial percentage of organic material which, when correctly
developed, yields copious amounts of natural gas. That gas can then be used for a host of
ends. The Marcellus formation is the largest shale gas formation of its kind in the world.
To put this into perspective, it contains an estimated almost 500 trillion cubic feet (TCF)
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―The Marcellus shale is an organic-rich black shale that was deposited in an oxygendeficient marine environment during Middle Devonian time (~390 million years ago)‖
(Harper).
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of in situ natural gas reserves. The amount of extractable volume continues to climb,
from the initial estimates ranging between 75-100 TCF to the more current estimates48
that surpass the initial estimates by more than 100%. The initial estimates of extractable
volume of natural gas could conceivably supply the entire United States‘ natural gas
needs for over two years (Engelder), whereas more recent (and admittedly less
conservative) estimates could provide as many as 20 years‘ worth of domestic natural gas
demand. The United States currently consumes more natural gas than any other nation in
the world – almost twice as much as Russia, the next nation on the list. Thus, even if only
the lower estimates prove accurate, the volume of extractable gas being discussed here
could have profound effects upon the natural gas market, worldwide.
The Marcellus, like the Barnett and the Haynesville plays, also requires highly
specialized geo-engineering techniques in order to develop and extract the gas trapped
within it, particularly hydrofracking and horizontal drilling.
2.2.2.1 Justifications for MSF recoverable volume
Many experts have proffered numerous estimates of recoverable natural gas
volume for the MSF. These estimates have varied from the low end of 25 TCF to
upwards of 400 TCF. While all of these various estimates have some basis for
justification, the most statistically sound (and credibly conservative) estimate comes from
Engelder and Lash:
Given a resource that is found under more than 34,000,000 acres of real
estate with at least 50 feet of organic-rich section, the Marcellus Shale
weighs in with more than 500 trillion cubic feet of gas in-place spread
over a four state area. Continuous natural gas accumulations such as the
Barnett Shale produce more than 10 percent of the gas in-place, which
48

Moors and other sources predict volumes ranging from 150 TCF to as much as 500
TCF of extractable volumes.
48

when applied to the Marcellus Shale, translates to a resource that will
return 50 Tcf in time. Confusion arises when this figure for technically
recoverable gas is compared with the U.S. Geological Survey‘s prediction
of 1.9 Tcf for an undiscovered resource in a portion of the Marcellus. The
two numbers should not be compared, since the USGS figure relies
heavily on knowledge of the ultimate recoverable gas per well. Because
there has been little production from the Marcellus, the USGS figure is
inherently low, but will begin to climb when production comes on line.
Production from the Huron/Dunkirk interval of the Big Sandy Field has
enabled the USGS to predict an undiscovered resource of 6.3 Tcf. This
field has less than 25 percent of acreage found within the boundaries of
the Marcellus play, and the average depth of the Big Sandy Field is less
than that of the heart of the Marcellus play. The scaling factor between the
Big Sandy Field and the Marcellus play is about eight, which means that
all else being equal, extrapolating the Dunkirk/Huron play suggests a total
resource of the Marcellus play of nearly 50 Tcf. With this extrapolation,
the USGS and Engelder-Lash estimates are in agreement. (Engelder and
Lash).
Based on the Engelder/Lash estimates, the Marcellus formation potentially holds enough
natural gas to turn the state into a net exporter of natural gas, rather than a substantial
importer. While this may sound a bit underwhelming, it must be kept in mind that this
amount of an available natural resource amounts to substantial market power in the form
of commodity price stability and national security. Moreover, from the standpoint of
statewide economic development, this price stability will make budgetary decisions
considerably easier to make, since it is the potential volatility in price as much as the
additional economic activity and other attendant issues that leads to difficult budgetary
and economic pressures. As a result, policymakers must place themselves in a position to
determine the most publicly favorable means of development, in order to most positively
affect the eventual outcomes of this new industrial development.
2.2.3 Road Maintenance and Water Usage: Study Variables
2.2.3.1 Road Infrastructure Issues
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Practically all industrial development involves the imposition of negative
externalities to the surrounding environment to some degree. Mineral extraction in
general, and oil and gas development in particular, causes a range of different types of
negative externalities. Drilling of any kind requires the use of heavy equipment, which
must be trucked in by large tractor-trailer trucks. Roadway damage is an expected result
of drilling as a result.
On September 30, 2009, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC)
of the state of New York issued the Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact
Statement (SGEIS), addressing numerous issues and complications arising from potential
natural gas drilling activities in the Marcellus Shale formation. The following is a listing
of the estimated truck trips necessary in order to develop a single shale gas well
(―Marcellus Shale gas‖). The trips have also been broken out by the respective phase of
activity and the number of trips per phase.
Drilling Rig Mobilization, Site Preparation and Demobilization
 Drill Pad and Road Construction Equipment 10 – 45 Truckloads
 Drilling Rig 30 Truckloads
 Drilling Fluid and Materials 25 – 50 Truckloads
 Drilling Equipment (casing, drill pipe, etc.) 25 – 50 Truckloads
 Completion Rig Mobilization and Demobilization
 Completion Rig 15 Truckloads
Well Completion
 Completion Fluid and Materials 10 - 20 Truckloads
 Completion Equipment (pipe, wellhead) 5 Truckloads
 Hydraulic Fracture Equipment (pump trucks, tanks) 150 - 200 Truckloads
 Hydraulic Fracture Water 400 - 600 Tanker Trucks
 Hydraulic Fracture Sand 20 - 25 Trucks
 Flow Back Water Removal 200 - 300 Truckloads
 Well Production
 Production Equipment 5 – 10 Truckloads
As soon as drilling begins at a given location, traffic increases dramatically. As
mentioned above, this traffic primarily consists of extremely heavy truck traffic. The first
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truckloads bring in heavy excavation equipment. If the wellsite is located in forested area,
like much of the development in Pennsylvania, then the equipment also includes forestry
equipment. The excavation equipment is used to prepare the wellpad site, where the bulk
of the drilling activity will take place. After creating the egress roads and grading the
wellpad site itself, hundreds of tons of gravel are trucked in, both for the wellpad itself
and for the access road.
Once the wellpad has been fully prepared, many more trucks – all extremely
heavy, weighing many tons each – haul in the drilling rig, which will enable the
horizontal drilling process that makes shale gas economically feasible in the first place.
Of course, once the drilling of the well has been completed, this equipment must be
hauled away from the drilling site to make space for the equipment and water needed to
perform the hydraulic fracturing, which actually releases the bulk of shale gas for
extraction. As is often the case, multiple wells may be drilled and fracked from the same
wellpad, adding to the amount of traffic with which a given location must deal. The
fracking process includes various types of equipment, from the actual high-pressure
pumping equipment to water holding tanks, tanker trucks, support trucks, sand trucks,
etc. (―Road damage‖).
Based on the information above, each shale gas well requires at least 905 separate
truck trips, and potentially as many as 1,320 – the bulk of which is primarily water. The
number of truckloads needed to frack wells ranges from 476-667 trips (at 3 million
gallons) to 714-1,000 trips (at 4.5 million gallons).
Water represents the single most traffic-intensive component of shale gas
development, but certainly is not the only issue. In fact, while water as a factor of
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production represents the highest number of truck trips, some of the excavation and
drilling equipment needed to prepare the wellpad and drill the well can be considerably
heavier than water loads. However, since water is the single largest factor in fracking a
shale gas well, it seems to make sense to consider that facet of the process more closely.
According to Chesapeake Energy‘s website, the water trucks most often used in
shale gas development can transport volumes of water between 4,500 and 6,300 gallons
per load. The volume depends upon the specific models of trucks used by a given
operator company. At 70 degrees Fahrenheit, the weight of water per gallon equals
8.3290 pounds. Therefore, a 6,300 gallon tanker truck would carry as much as 52,472.7
pounds of water. The weight of the water is in addition to the weight of the truck itself,
which can exceed 28,000 pounds on its own. With truck and water combined, the total
can often exceed 80,000 pounds, which exceeds the legally allowed maximum weight for
state and federal highways in both Texas and Pennsylvania. As noted above, to frack a
single well requires hundreds of truckloads of water, whether a company uses 4,500
gallon, 6,300 gallon tankers, or something in between. The real variable here is how
much water each individual well requires in order to successfully hydraulically fracture
the underlying rock formation. By considering water loads, one can get a general picture
of the types of damage this traffic can cause.
According to The Handbook of Highway Engineering by T. F. Fwa, the traditional
planning of highways, from construction to maintenance, centered on ―considered traffic
mix repetitions and material properties as the primary input variables for structural
designs‖ with little to no consideration for environmental effects or material degradation
or maintenance scheduling over time (Fwa 18.16-17). When such heavy traffic activity
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like shale gas development – both in overall net tonnage of the vehicles and the
frequency of that traffic – arrives to a given area, the overall stress placed upon the local
infrastructure can overwhelm the design in a very short time. Thus, even when companies
argue that the time period of heaviest activity of drilling in a given area will be limited 49,
there will still be substantial damage done to the highway infrastructure, particularly if
the roads and highways in question were not originally built to standards which will
support such high axle weights or traffic volumes. As stated in Fwa 2006, ―Heavy traffic
load repetitions will in all cases accelerate damage caused by environmental factors and
material degradation.‖50 Therefore, according to Fwa the overall damage sustained by
road infrastructure in areas of dramatic seasonal weather change will likely be
considerably higher than otherwise would be the case when the stress of high-volume
heavy traffic is added.
The critical point to consider, at least with regard to Marcellus shale development
as it differs from Barnett shale development, is the overall climate and weather patterns
involved. Pennsylvania typically has large seasonal changes, which have a dramatic
effect on road surfaces. Weather and traffic have a tremendous impact on roads. Compare
this weather-related complication of road maintenance to the seasonal changes in Texas,
where seasons tend to be considerably less extreme and the weather itself is more
49

Chesapeake claims that the company is able to drill a typical Barnett Shale gas well in
about 20 days (―Kennedale‖).
50
Fwa goes on to state that ―[t]hermal cracking in concrete slabs can be caused by three
to four times larger tensile stress due to high temperature differential from the top surface
to the bottom, compared to the load induced tensile stress. Low temperature thermal
cracking of asphalt pavements is initiated by very low ambient temperatures. Pothole
formation during spring-thaw season represents a good example of interaction of three
mechanisms; load repetitions, weakening of sublayers and roadbed soil, and thaw
(environmental) conditions‖ (Fwa).
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conducive to maintaining healthy roads. As established above, when heavy traffic
volumes and weights interact with climatological effects on road infrastructure, the end
result is one of substantially higher maintenance and replacement costs. Thus, one would
expect that, all other variables being equal, Pennsylvania will likely experience even
greater infrastructure degradation resulting from shale gas development than Texas did in
its development of the Barnett.
In the US, the public sector generally builds and maintains transportation
infrastructure, particularly public highways. Highways have traditionally been the
primary means of inter- and intra-state goods transport for decades. As public goods,
roads and highways are generally available for all to use, with relatively few regulations.
As usage increases, so do the associated costs for maintenance and network expansion, as
the demand for deeper network penetration and overall road and highway quality
increases.
As industrial usage increases, so do the costs of maintenance, particularly as the
overall tonnage of cargo increases. For example, it stands to reason that a truck carrying
drilling equipment or water needed for drilling and weighing many tons will degrade road
surfaces and subsurfaces faster than normal highway traffic, all other variables being
equal.
Moreover, such heavy traffic dramatically affects the strength of bridges. As a
report by the Florida Department of Transportation stated, ―gross weight, axle weight,
and axle configuration of heavy trucks directly affect the service life of highway bridge
superstructures‖ (Wang). This is particularly important in Pennsylvania, as there are a
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tremendous number of bridges in the state, due to the high number of rivers and streams
throughout the state.
According to federal guidelines established for the National Interstate System, the
maximum gross vehicle weight is 80,000 pounds. This weight restriction is further
limited by per-axle weight limits. 51 The average weight limit for state highways in Texas
generally are built to the same standards as federal highways (Luskin and Walton).
However, on as many as 40% of what are commonly known as ―farm-to-market‖ roads in
Texas, gross vehicle weight is limited to 58,420 pounds. This justification of this weight
limit standard is based on the fact that many of these roads were built many years ago,
prior to the establishment of the current federal highway weight standards. Furthermore, a
high number of bridges in Texas are load restricted, including as many as 4,000 that were
built to standards that fail to meet the 58,420 pound standard for the farm-to-market road
network (Stringer). The county and city roads and highways often fail to meet even the
considerably lower weight standards of the farm-to-market network of roads. The end
result of these lower standards amounts to higher levels of wear-and-tear on these
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The following is an excerpt from the Federal Highway Administration‘s regulations:
―658.17 Weight. (a) The provisions of the section are applicable to the National System
of Interstate and Defense Highways and reasonable access thereto. (b) The maximum
gross vehicle weight shall be 80,000 pounds except where lower gross vehicle weight is
dictated by the bridge formula. (c) The maximum gross weight upon any one axle,
including any one axle of a group of axles, or a vehicle is 20,000 pounds. (d) The
maximum gross weight on tandem axles is 34,000 pounds. (e) No vehicle or combination
of vehicles shall be moved or operated on any Interstate highway when the gross weight
on two or more consecutive axles exceeds the limitations prescribed by the Bridge Gross
Weight Formula, except that two consecutive sets of tandem axles may carry a gross load
of 34,000 pounds each if the overall distance between the first and last axle is 36 feet or
more. In no case shall the total gross weight of a vehicle exceed 80,000 pounds‖ (―CFR2008‖).
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highways, as they simply were not built for the types of tonnage wear caused by the
water trucks used for water transportation for hydrofracking.
According to a report published by the Highway Research Board, NAS, in 1962, a
single 40-ton (80,000 pound) truck does the amount of damage to road and highway
pavement equivalent to 9,600 passenger cars. While many of the highways that have been
laid down since 1962 are built according to higher standards than those built at earlier
points in time, many of the highways and roads, particularly in rural areas, are built to the
same standards that they always were (―The AASHO Road Test‖).
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation‘s Highway Cost Allocation
Study, taxes on excessively heavy trucks – including water trucks and so-called
―combination trucks‖52 – weighing 80,000 to 100,000 pounds only pay around half of the
net cost of the wear and damage caused to roads and highways (―Highway Cost‖). The
report also found a negative correlation between the weight of these super-heavy trucks
and the amount of damage the taxes assessed actually cover. In other words, as the
weight of a given truck goes up, the less maintenance the taxes on that truck will actually
pay for. For example, the study determined that taxes on trucks that weigh 100,000
pounds and above only pay for approximately 40% of the damage they cause. The result
amounts to the spreading of maintenance costs to the general public, leading to further
budgetary pressures (―Addendum‖).
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According to BTS Transportation Expressions website, a combination truck is ―a
tractor pulling at least one full or semi-trailer or a single-unit truck pulling at least one
trailer. (NHTSA3) (NHTSA4) Consists of a power unit (a truck tractor) and one or more
trailing units (a semi-trailer or trailer). The most frequently used combination is popularly
referred to as a ‗tractor-semitrailer‘ or ‗tractor trailer‘. (ATA2) (DOE6)‖ (―Combination
Truck‖).
56

In 2010, the state of Pennsylvania issued five citations to a single drilling
contractor, totaling $31,304. The citations were issued because the drilling contractor was
operating a truck that carried a gross weight of 89.7 tons – 179,400 pounds – despite only
being registered for 40 tons (Wilber).
The rural roads and highways where most of the drilling in the Marcellus
formation will be occurring simply were not designed for either the weight or the volume
of traffic transported to and from shale gas wells. Even in Texas, where drilling thus far
has been in comparatively much more urbanized areas, specifically Denton, Tarrant
counties, roads and highways have suffered much greater rates of degradation than would
have been the case ordinarily. In both Texas and Pennsylvania, roads and bridges are
often posted with weight restrictions, to provide indications and warnings of at-risk
infrastructure. Companies can often exceed the legal restrictions either by applying for
variances or securing performance bonds, which require companies to perform or pay for
maintenance resulting from their activity (―Road Bonding‖).
2.2.3.2 Recent Road News
Pennsylvania has already seen substantial drilling activity in some rural areas. In
fact, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) revoked permits for
Chesapeake Energy‘s use of four state-maintained highways in northwest Pennsylvania
(―Gas Business‖). According to the regulations specific to the roads in question, the
weight limit is capped at 10 tons. However, Chesapeake was granted a variance to move
the necessary equipment and water into areas like Bradford County for hydrofracking
shale wells. The variance stipulated that Chesapeake "proactively monitor[s] pavement
conditions and immediately begin[s] repairs as needed to keep the road safe." According
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to its website, PennDot suspended Chesapeake‘s usage permits due to the company‘s
failure to deal with severe roadway damage caused by its drilling activities.
Under the terms of the use permit, Chesapeake is to "proactively monitor
pavement conditions and immediately begin repairs as needed to keep the road safe," the
website announcement says. Despite the normal10-ton weight restriction, Chesapeake‘s
permits allowed the movement of considerably heavier vehicles and equipment on the
roads in question so long as the company would be responsible for repairs to damages
caused by their the additional traffic and weight loads.
2.2.3.3 Conclusion
Based on the available literature, it is clear that heavy trucks, carrying even
heavier equipment, travelling on roads not designed to accommodate such heavy loads,
and doing so many hundreds, or even thousands of times, leads inexorably to dramatic
degradation of local road and highway infrastructure. This damage can be mitigated, but
remediation and repair can be expensive. This is particularly true if the culprits shirk
responsibilities for maintenance, or are never required to do so in the first place. While
the damage to roads and highways associated with well development cannot be fully
avoided, it absolutely can be minimized and repaired after the fact. Thus, road and
highway infrastructure damage represents a critical associated negative externality of
shale gas development that state and local policies can effectively address.
2.2.3.4 Water Usage
While it would be beyond the scope of this work to develop a stand-alone set of
water usage estimates, much of the data needed, and the projection estimates from those
data were designed and compiled in a 2007 study by Bene and Harden, under the name
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Northern Trinity/Woodbine Aquifer Groundwater Availability Model: Assessment of
Groundwater Use in the Northern Trinity Aquifer Due to Urban Growth and Barnett
Shale Development. The report projected water usage in the Barnett based on projected
growth models, none of which proved accurate compared to how development actually
proceeded in the Barnett.53 Unfortunately, this particular study deviates greatly from what
actually occurred. However, this study provides considerable insight into how to establish
reliable projections for water usage.
While the Bene and Harden study focused narrowly on the Northern Trinity and
Woodbine Aquifers in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, the study specifically addressed both
urban growth and Barnett shale development. This aligns well with addressing the
microeconomic developments arising from water usage. 54
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Undoubtedly, much of the stunting of development in the Barnett, and thus the
deviation from the models within the Bene and Harden report was the direct result of the
economic downturn that began in 2008. While it is difficult to estimate the degree to
which Barnett development suffered as a result of the economic recession, it is clear that
a large portion of the decline in activity was due to the collapse in natural gas prices that
was precipitated by the economic downturn. The collapse in natural gas prices greatly
reduced the profitability of drilling new wells in the Barnett. In fact, the price of natural
gas still has not recovered to pre-recession levels. As such, Barnett development likewise
has not recovered to pre-recession levels. Thus, the Bene and Harden models failed to
accurately predict Barnett development mostly because their models did not presupposed
or predict exogenous price shocks like the subprime collapse.
54
The Bene and Harden study based its research upon a groundwater availability model
originally developed for the northern Trinity Aquifer and combined with data gathered by
surveys designed and mailed by Freese and Nichols, Inc., which mailed the surveys to
123 water entities in their study area. The survey ―inquired about water use since 2000,
particularly focusing on water use in the Trinity aquifer. Forty-seven percent of the
recipients participated in the survey…. The information provided by these entities helped
establish the historical water use in the Trinity aquifer. … Some entities have made
agreements to purchase surface water and plan to decrease their dependence on the
Trinity aquifer. Others plan to continue using the Trinity aquifer as their sole water
supply‖ (Bene et al. 1-1).
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These projections fell into three separate categories, all based upon proposed well
completions in the Barnett, and were labeled ―low,‖ ―medium,‖ and ―high‖ to coincide
with the projections based upon historical well completion numbers in the Barnett. In
comparing the projections to actual data from 2008 onward, the projections deviated
significantly from actual well completion. The low projection, for example, overstates the
expected number of 2010 well completions by 432 new wells spud, or 40.4%.
The study projections were based upon the market conditions at the time of the
study, which preceded the global economic collapse and the subsequent drop in natural
gas prices. Barnett shale development, like all hydrocarbon development, is heavily
dependent upon market prices. Production may not make good economic or financial
sense if the cost of the end product is not high enough. In this case, few in the financial
markets warned against the possibility of such an exogenous shock to the overall energy
markets.
In addition, the volumes of water this study used understated the volumes of water
being used to drill and frack the Barnett wells. When compared to the Chesapeake
Energy estimates, the numbers used in the Bene and Harden study understate the volume
of water needed per well by as much an 1.2 million gallons of water.55
It should also be noted that re-fracking of the first horizontal wells from the early
2000s has commenced (―U.S. Shale Gas‖). This in essence amounts to repeating the same
process that originally occurred to develop the well. The major difference is that the well
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Chesapeake Energy has published numerous estimates for water usage in both the
Barnett play and the Marcellus. The estimates referred to here are the ones that deal
specifically to the Barnett.
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itself has already been drilled, and the process focuses on opening new fractures in the
source rock below. Refracking was not accounted for in the Bene and Harden study.
According to this study, ―[d]uring a drought, there is increased pressure on water
supplies to support increased irrigation and other demands. While conservation measures
can eventually reduce overall consumption, increased groundwater use can initially occur
during dry weather conditions‖ (Bene and Harden 27). Thus, it is important to recognize
that drought conditions may not reduce industrial usage until after substantial stores of
groundwater have already been used.
According to a 2007 study, all water in Texas that ―flows in creeks, rivers, and
bays is owned and managed by the State‖ (Nicot and Potter). Accordingly, any person or
concern withdrawing surface water ―for mining, construction, and oil or gas activities
must obtain a water rights permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(TCEQ).‖ It is unclear if this regulation is uniformly enforced. Based on the discrepancy
between the numbers reported to the TCEQ and the figures released by various drilling
companies, the potential for underreporting exists. This has been bolstered by anecdotal
evidence by officials in the Barnett area.56 This water source change – from one easily
trackable, to many that are not – would explain why the numbers available officially and
the numbers released in press releases by companies differ greatly.
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According to Denton, TX officials, many of the companies who had been purchasing
water from the City of Denton secured arrangements with private landowners to use their
collected surface water, in order to reduce the costs associated with purchasing water
from a municipality (Nickerson).
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A number of recycling companies have become active in these shale plays. 57
However, these recycling technologies had not been put into action on any large scale in
the Barnett until recently – from 2008 onward. Hence, these technologies will alter the
overall projections of water usage moving forward – particularly in plays that have not
yet experienced the larger portion of development – but they have not heavily affected
water usage in the Barnett play to date. Nicot and Potter went on to conclude that, while
the recycling technology is proven and available, the practice of recycling would take
time to before it would cause a significant effect on water usage.
As was the case in Texas for the Barnett development, such considerable volumes
of water necessary for developing the Marcellus play could well play havoc with
groundwater supplies, particularly under conditions of drought or areas with over-taxed
water systems. This was the case in Texas recently when Texas experienced sustained
periods of drought.58
In addition to this, drilling companies will be required to truck in much of the
water necessary for this development. While Pennsylvania, unlike Texas, enjoys
substantial and reliable water sources, the magnitude of the Marcellus shale development
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Some recycling companies capable of addressing the issues specific to shale gas
development include companies like Ecosphere Technologies or Fountain Quail.
Fountain Quail did not become active in the Barnett play until 2005, at which point it
began with a single field unit and tested its evaporation method south of the town of
Decatur, in Wise County. The first was initiated in Wise County, south of Decatur, by
Fountain Quail Water Management in 2005. DTE Gas Resources also became active in
the Barnett in 2005. Ecosphere did not become active in the Barnett play until 2008.
There are other companies also active in the Barnett (―RIGZONE,‖ ―Water recycling‖).
58
Texas is currently experiencing its worst drought in decades. U.S. Drought Monitor, a
non-profit effort at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, categorizes the current drought
conditions in Texas as ―exceptional,‖ their worst designation (McFerron and Campbell,
―US Drought Monitor‖).
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may make that a moot point simply because of the sheer enormity of the volumes of
water involved and the increased chance of groundwater contamination that such
extensive development will entail. Much of the water to be used in the Marcellus will
simply be collected from rivers, streams, ponds, and wells. Due to the urban nature of the
Barnett play, where operator companies could purchase water from municipalities as well
as take surface water or drill their own wells, and the rural nature of the Marcellus play,
the simple fact of the matter is that there will likely be substantially greater amounts of
traffic resulting from Marcellus development, as opposed to Barnett development.
Moreover, that traffic will likely do more damage because of the comparably less-wellengineered roads in Pennsylvania‘s rural areas.
2.3 A Political Crossroads: What Path Should Pennsylvania Take?
2.3.1 Severance Taxes vs. Natural Resource Funds
As mentioned previously, severance taxes can function in many ways like NRFs.
This is mostly related to how the money ends up being implemented from a policy
standpoint. However, severance taxes differ on a major, if overlooked point that makes
all the difference in the world: separate management.
Just as in the financial world, commingling of funds generally never leads to
positive results. By allowing severance proceeds to reside in the general fund, there are
simply too many incentives – political, economic, financial – for policymakers to pass up
using that revenue for general purposes. This leads to the possibility of the government in
question falling into the trap of allowing those revenues to feed into the resource curse
negative feedback loop: expansion of services during boom times, deficit/debt –funded
spending in lean times. This negative feedback loop results in no long-term benefit from
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the windfall of resource extraction royalties, due to disincentives to save general fund
revenues and the natural business cycles that lead to commodity price volatility.
NRFs provide a number of protections from these pitfalls. First, by sequestering
the funds, there is no comingling of funds, and therefore no completely surreptitious way
to spend those funds. Second, if established properly, the NRF provides a responsive and
responsible administration of those revenues in a politically fair and palatable manner.
While an NRF is only as effective as its charter and initial (or even subsequent) tasking, it
provides considerably more protection and oversight over the use of royalty revenues.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Rationale for the Research and Current Status of the Problem
The ongoing search for relatively inexpensive energy sources has led to the
development of new technologies, enabling access to previously unusable resources. The
recent boom in shale gas development has only happened because of these new
technologies coupled with older technologies, making shale gas an economically viable
energy option. However, shale gas plays, like some other unconventional hydrocarbon
plays, exhibit comparably steep extraction curves. The nature of these plays lends itself to
initially higher rates of extraction with subsequent precipitous production collapses.
Such sharp changes potentially create or exacerbate boom-bust cycles and their
attendant economic problems. Shale gas development is also a young and poorly
understood process, the environmental and geological effects of which have scarcely
been considered. However, much research is being conducted to determine precisely
what the effects may be. A recent example of this push to develop without waiting to
understand the consequences is the micro-tremor problem in the Fayetteville shale
formation, which seem to be directly linked to fracking activity in the region (Robertson).
This research has a specific focus on the budgetary issues that may arise as a
result of shale gas development – specifically, the economic impact of shale gas drilling
as measured through road infrastructure and water management.
3.2 Statement of the research objectives
The present research paper has the objective to investigate the need for
Pennsylvania to establish a state gas fund in anticipation of budgetary and
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microeconomic complications arising from the development of the Marcellus shale
formation.
3.3 Research Question
The research question for this thesis is as follows:
Does the development of natural gas shale reserves create the conditions for the
development of negative economic externalities?
If so, can these attendant economic problems be effectively managed and
mitigated by the creation of a natural resource fund (or ―gas fund‖)?

3.4 Research design
3.4.1 Barnett Shale Formation
Data for this research is focused primarily on the Barnett shale formation in
Texas. The Barnett development is the most mature development of a shale gas field in
the world. Most of the current techniques in the field of natural gas extraction were
developed there. The Barnett play has been steadily and seriously developed since 1999.
The Barnett can provide meaningful guidance in terms of what one might expect moving
forward with new plays. At minimum, it can provide a case against which new
production and development may be compared. The Barnett should provide a good
baseline test case upon which to construct a model for future unconventional hydrocarbon
plays.
While other shale gas plays in the United States (including the Marcellus, the
Haynesville, and the Fayetteville) have seen considerable interest and development, the
Barnett remains the most well-established with the largest amount of readily available
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data. Moreover, the Barnett has become the basis for projections in the Marcellus
formation. The precedent has been established by Engelder and Lash (volume
projections) and Considine (economic benefits) (Engelder and Lash, Considine et al. ―An
Emerging Giant‖).
Where applicable, data analysis is confined to the years 2000 and 2007. Where
data is not readily available annually, or showed a standard curve/rate of growth through
that time period, the beginning and end dates were used exclusively. Pre-2000 data is not
relevant because using directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing together, which makes
shale gas exploration economically viable, was not used before 2000. Starting with 2000
data enables the research to view the Barnett shale play in its infancy. The year 2007 was
chosen as a stopping point because the 2008 housing collapse and economic recession
had the potential to skew data for reasons completely unrelated to shale gas development.
In addition, the curve of the extraction volume in the Barnett becomes
unpredictable after 2007. Because this research aims to focus on issues relevant to
Marcellus formation start-up, the changing curve would only serve to confuse the issues
at hand. Figures 4-5 depict the growth of active wells and extraction volume (gas and
condensates) from 2000-2010, illustrating this issue.
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Figure 4. Total Monthly Extracted Gas Volume (MCF) in Barnett Play 2000-2010

Source: Texas Railroad Commission
Figure 5. Total Monthly Extracted Condensate Volume (BBL) in Barnett Play 2000-2010

Source: Texas Railroad Commission
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3.4.2 County breakdown
Initial population data is viewed for all variables at the county level. The Barnett
shale formation is centered on four counties (referred to as the ―core‖ counties – Denton,
Johnson, Tarrant, and Wise counties). 59 All data tables in this research will include these
four counties. In addition, initial tables in the transportation section will reference the
seventeen counties adjacent to them (referred to as the ―peripheral‖ counties – Bosque,
Clay, Comanche, Cooke, Coryell, Dallas, Eastland, Ellis, Erath, Hamilton, Hill, Hood,
Jack, Montague, Palo Pinto, Parker, and Somervell counties) as well as other counties in
the state with a population of 40,000 and above (a total of 68 of the state‘s 254
counties).60 Table 5 lists the counties and their 2000 and 2007 populations.
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Between January 2000 and December 2010, the core counties had 12,387/15,644 shale
gas wells in the state (79.2%) and 7,697,860,795 MCF/8,672,219,628 MCF production in
the state (88.8%).
60
The 40,000 cutoff point is rounded down from the 2000 population of Wise County
(45,094). These 68 counties had a 2000 population total of 17,733,620/20,190,519 in the
state (87.8%).
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Table 5. Study Counties (Barnett Shale Play)

3.4.3 Independent variables
The goal of the research question is to determine whether, how, and by how much
the hydrocarbon industry development affects the local and state economies in which it
occurs. While the possible ways to address and measure such changes are manifold, this
study focuses specifically upon budgetary and microeconomic effects stemming from
shale gas development – specifically road infrastructure damage and the fair market value
of water usage. It is exceedingly clear from the available literature that extractive
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industries create substantial externalities – both positive and negative – for the states,
regions, and localities in which development occurs. Therefore, the intent here is to
determine a reliable means of calculating those effects. Data for the number of wells
used, the volume of gas extracted, and volume of condensates extracted is used to
determine how the size of the play affects immediate localities. 61 These three variables
are the primary independent variables in this research, the combination of which will
provide the tools necessary to create both descriptive and predictive models.62 In theory,
production on a small scale will have a comparably smaller effect upon the surrounding
area than production on a larger scale, which would both be necessitated and indicated by
larger per well volumes. The larger the scale of the production, the more complicated the
policy and budgetary implications will be. In this way, the number of wells drilled and
the volume extracted provide a solid basis for comparison, and a credible representation
of level of development.
3.4.4 Dependent variables
Shale gas has a quick but expensive initial development period, and exhibits steep
depletion curves. This compressed timeline for play development lends itself to what
amounts to faster, more capital-intensive development for localities (McFarland, Nuttall).
While a given state as a whole may not necessarily experience budgetary complications
on a large scale, localities often experience micro boom/bust cycles. The potential for
many pockets of extreme deindustrialization, increased service load, and higher traffic
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For example, higher volume extracted per well drilled generally indicates greater
wellpad size, overall displacement, and a higher number of workers operating the site.
62
Data on wells and production volume is obtained from the Texas Railroad Commission
(TRRC). Texas requires reporting of extractable volume at the wellhead for both oil and
natural gas extraction to the TRRC. This is the primary and most accurate data source for
well numbers and production volume in Texas.
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should be addressed before local areas are negatively impacted. Since this work is limited
to considering two specific types of negative externalities, the variables will reflect this
focus. The variables considered, then, include projected infrastructure costs and expenses
as well as projected water usage and estimated fair market values of water used.
3.4.4.1 Infrastructure
One of the most identifiable effects hydrocarbon development can have on a
given locality is the increase in traffic on roads and highways. For shale gas, the problem
is amplified because of the transportation of clean water to well sites for the fracking
process, and removal of flowback water for disposal. Unless pipeline infrastructure exists
for these purposes, tanker trucks must be used. Due to the realities of both shale gas
development and basic capital infrastructure in the U.S. – truncated development cycles
when compared to oil, leading to relatively short and punctuated local development, as
well as a lack of dedicated water or gas transmission pipelines as is the case in most areas
of shale gas development in the U.S. – high numbers of truckloads is an accurate
assumption with regard to shale gas development.
Road infrastructure will likely be one of the greatest immediate and ongoing
attendant costs associated with shale gas development. It will also be the most readily
observable and measurable, and could potentially affect the greatest number of people.
Operator companies have taken to avoiding state and county roads in both Texas and
Pennsylvania wherever possible. The resultant pressure on local roads is magnified
because non-state and non-county roads must be maintained with local tax receipts. Local
roads also do not generally meet the same standards for usage or tonnage that state or
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county roads must meet. Because of these factors, infrastructure degradation can be more
extreme on already lower-quality roads.
By keeping to local roads, operator companies shift the maintenance burden to
localities, which have proportionally less power than the state as a whole. With smaller
constituencies and fewer observers in general, the negative externality of infrastructure
degradation gets less direct attention and therefore less funding than such a problem
might ordinarily warrant.
Despite these potential problems, Texas has developed long-standing
relationships with oil and gas developers at both the state and local levels. Wellestablished laws and regulations are also present. Moreover, the overall quality of roads
in Texas is high.63 This is due in part to the relatively road-friendly climate in Texas,
where temperatures rarely dip far below freezing. General maintenance necessary for
repairing climate induced damage is minimal compared to northern states. Despite Texas‘
proportionally higher taxpayer burdens for high-quality roads, this also indicates both a
willingness on the part of Texas policymakers to prioritize highway expenditures and an
uncanny responsiveness to concerns arising from complications in highway
transportation.
Data chosen for highway costs comes from the Texas Department of
Transportation‘s District and County Statistics (DISCOS) reports, which provides data
relating to roads, highways, bridges, and aviation (―DISCOS‖). Data relating to number
of registered vehicles – public monies spent on new construction, repair, and maintenance
63

According to reason.org‘s 19th Annual Report on the Performance of State Highway
Systems (2010), Texas ranks 13th overall, indicating proportionally better overall
outcomes, despite low marks in total disbursements (36 th) and urban interstate congestion
(37th).
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of existing roads – is used for this research. The transportation maintenance budget must,
by its very nature, be a lagging indicator of problems. That being said, it is an indicator
only in direct proportion to how responsive the government in question happens to be to
such problems, and how strong the imbedded constituency for such an amenity happens
to be. In Texas‘ case, the state legislature seems to be highly responsive, and the built-in
constituency likewise seems rather sensitive to worsening highway conditions. It remains
to be seen how effective this variable will prove to be when applying it to other shale gas
developments.
While the number of cases for each group, particularly the core group, limit
greatly the degree to which any inferential techniques can be brought to bear, one can still
get a rather clear picture of what has happened in these areas by looking at the numbers.
The lack of inferential statistical analysis limits the degree to which one can establish a
multivariate causal model, but the observations themselves can provide considerable
insight into how extractive industries – and shale gas in particular – will pan out
elsewhere.
The study of infrastructure costs in Texas requires considering actual dollars spent
on maintenance. Unfortunately, Texas funds its infrastructure at a number of levels.
While the state provides funding for state highways via federal money and state taxes, the
counties are responsible for maintaining county roads, and towns and cities are, by and
large, required to service the roads that fall within their jurisdiction. The Texas
Department of Transportation (TXDOT) collects data on funding, but it does not include
local funding, or even all county funding. Despite this, the DISCOS data provided by the
TXDOT remains the best alternative for data on highway maintenance, as the data is
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collected uniformly across the state. While data on county and city maintenance does
exist, there are many formats and measures that do not necessarily make for easy
comparisons. The DISCOS data, while incomplete with respect to localities and some
county funding, is the best and most uniform data available.
The best way to address this issue is to compare actual maintenance costs,
measured in dollars per lane mile. TXDOT breaks out total maintenance costs, as well as
provides total lane miles by county. Therefore, in order to determine cost per lane mile,
the computation is a simple matter of dividing total dollars spent by the number of miles
of state-funded highway found within each county.
This variable will ideally prove that shale gas development has a substantially
greater overall effect on local and state budgets than has been presumed up to this point.
It should serve as an indicator for policymakers to take greater care in considering more
broadly the attendant effects of such large-scale, but relatively one-dimensional,
economic activities.
3.4.4.2 Water
Fracking can use either surface water or groundwater as a source. Currently, it is
estimated that companies use groundwater approximately 60% of the time, with countywide averages ranging from about 45% to 90% (Bene et al.). While the majority of the
water used in the Barnett shale development came from groundwater sources (Byrd), a
substantial amount still was either purchased from municipalities or taken from surface
water sources (Nickerson).
Despite substantially more monitoring of water usage in the Barnett by the Texas
Water Development Board (TWDB) and other semi-public entities – particularly
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important considering both how much water is used in fracking and the extent to which
droughts afflict Texas water supplies – the situation in the Barnett still does not present
an optimal solution. There are literally thousands of water providers in Texas. There
remains no central storehouse of data for water usage, unlike the Texas Railroad
Commission‘s (RRC) tracking of gas production. This lack of centralization of statistics
regarding water usage has made the data gathering challenging.
Therefore, using the projections adapted from the Bene, et al. study, one can
estimate microeconomic effects, using the municipal rates available from Tarrant and
Denton counties. 64 Once these basic guidelines and estimations have been devised, this
methodology will then be projected for the Marcellus play.
Since the Bene, et al. projections fail to provide an accurate estimate of water
volume in regard to drilling, a new model must be devised. Currently a number of
companies can effectively recycle flowback water to a degree that some can be reused, up
to 80% of captured flowback water (―Welcome to Fountain Quail‖). If approximately
70% of the water used to frack a horizontally drilled well returns, and 80% of that water
can be reused, the asymptotic function approaches zero after only 8 cycles. The result of
this is an increase of 127% efficiency in terms of the amount of water that can be used. In
other words, if 100 gallons are used initially, it equals a total of approximately 227
gallons of water that can be used for fracking, or an additional 127 gallons over and
above the original 100 gallons (―Water Use‖).
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The intent here is to determine fair market value for the water. By employing the
pricing structure used by the biggest municipal water providers in the area, it provides
relatively accurate estimates of what private users should be paying for water usage.
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The nature of both water use projections and drilling – with newer and better
technologies altering the operational calculus almost constantly – complicate the task of
determining the impact of Barnett Shale production on groundwater. Water used for
fracking can be found practically anywhere, from groundwater, surface water, municipal
sources, or recycling previously used water. Still, transporting water in from elsewhere –
even if the distances are relatively small – can become very expensive very quickly.
Therefore, developing and instituting better recycling technologies is a high priority for
operating companies as a means of both minimizing costs for water usage further and
providing a better public façade for the water usage issue in general. Indeed, the
additional demand pressure that drilling imposes upon the supply of water will likely
become a high priority for localities as well.
The Barnett and the Marcellus formations will require different amounts of water
in order to frack. While a Marcellus well averages about 3 million gallons per frack,65 a
well in the Barnett averages about 4.5 million gallons per frack (―Barnett Shale
Production‖). This is because Marcellus shale tends to run shallower than Barnett shale,
and deeper plays require greater amounts of water to frack a well. Also, the rules and
regulations regarding drilling in Pennsylvania require fewer frack stages in the Marcellus,
thus requiring less water.66 A typical Marcellus well usually requires completions that
involve multi-stage fracks with more than three stages per well (―US Shale Gas‖).
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According to a 2008 study done by John Harper of the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Topographic and Geologic Survey, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources,
―a horizontal well completion might use more than 3 million gallons‖ of water for a
successful single-stage frac job.
66
In wells with multiple frac stages, each successive frac stage generally requires more
water than the previous stage, due to the length or depth of the well being drilled, as well
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However, some observers67 anticipate larger total volumes of water in the
Marcellus. Even if the Marcellus wells tend to require less water for each well, there will
likely be more wells drilled in the Marcellus. The Marcellus is both richer and larger than
the Barnett play, and is more dense. Because of the Marcellus source rock‘s
comparatively higher organic content,68 the projections for total gas extractions anticipate
considerably higher gas extraction volumes, also likely to require more water for
extraction.
It should be noted here that, even with the projections for potential extractable gas
from the Marcellus, there are a bevy of estimates for the number of wells needed to fully
exploit the resource.69 However, this model is designed to provide broad estimates. As
with the other models established in the work, it is very sensitive to the inputs of the
variables. In this case, using the lifetime per-well estimate from the Barnett very well
may not be accurate, because the Marcellus seems to be producing considerably more
gas, under considerably more pressure, than the Barnett wells. Therefore, going forward,
this model will necessarily need to be tweaked in order to provide ongoing accurate
projections as technology and more data become available.
This model is meant to provide new insights into ways in which one can more
accurately and fairly determine the damage to infrastructure being caused by drilling

as the additional pressure from previous fracs dissipating into previously fracked shale
rock.
67
Even Chesapeake, one of the major operator companies in the Marcellus, is estimating
very high water volumes. Most recently, the company released a fact sheet that used the
volume of 5.6 million gallons as an average volume of water needed to successfully drill
and hydrofrac Marcellus shale gas wells (―Water Use Fact Sheet‖).
68
Typically, higher organic content in shale results in higher potential extractable
hydrocarbon volume. This is generally the case with both oil and natural gas shale.
69
Moors‘ estimate or 110,000-220,000 wells, for example.
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activities. While this author feels that it is a rather accurate assessment of the problem,
there will always be room for improvement to the model. The model itself is an
abstraction, an attempt to aggregate the damage overall, rather than to determine point
damage to specific roads and highways at specific times. Moreover, this research is
meant to be the beginning of much more future research, rather than a terminus, and it
should be received with that in mind.
There will undoubtedly be criticism of this work, and not undeservedly. Some of
the core assumptions, particularly the traffic equivalency measure, need to be updated so
as to provide a more timely and recent assessment of road damage based on the newest
data and construction techniques. That being said, no updated research has been found
after 1962, and therefore represents the weakest portion of this model.
However, it should be noted that while the study may or may not prove to provide
the most recent and accurate assessments of damage equivalencies, that is simply a matter
of altering inputs to the model, rather than undermining the model‘s design itself. Once
new engineering research has been performed, this model should become even more
robust, and its results even more valuable to policymakers.
Furthermore, it should also be noted that the entire intent behind this research is to
provide actionable analysis for policymakers, or at very least a framework for analysis
within which policymakers can make more informed and fairer decisions regarding
policy.
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Chapter 4: Results
4.1 Roads
4.1.1 Introduction
Road infrastructure damage is probably the most visible initial effect of shale gas
development, particularly if the development is rural in nature. While any casual
bystander can witness the comings and goings of oversized loads trucking in water, sand,
and equipment, the clearly observable residual effects of this development tend to
manifest as broken pavement, cracked or bent bridge trusses, or even completely
destroyed roadbeds. Even in urban settings, where the roads and highways tend to be
newer – and often better built and maintained due to the higher traffic patterns – the
amount of damage can be substantial. The following sections describe and explain the
road infrastructure results from analyzing development from the Barnett, as well as
projections based upon the best estimates for usage in the Marcellus.
4.1.2 Barnett
4.1.2.1 Annual well completions
Table 6 shows the number of wells completed in the four core counties of the
Barnett formation during the two years examined for this research. No substantial amount
of development occurred in any of the counties in 2000 relative to what occurred later;
therefore, that year functions as the baseline. The development that had occurred prior to
that point in time consisted almost solely of vertical wells, since this period predates the
convergence of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Hence, the tremendous
amounts of water, sand, chemicals, and equipment needed to hydraulically fracture and
directionally drill those wells had not yet factored in to the overall road infrastructure
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maintenance costs. Since Texas has been a major producer of petroleum and natural gas
for a number of decades prior to the advent of shale gas development, the state had
already factored into the road maintenance calculations much, if not all, of the projected
costs associated with conventional hydrocarbon production.
Production in Johnson County, the last of the four ―core‖ counties in the Barnett
formation, had not yet begun in 2000 despite the fact that development had begun in the
other three core counties. There is a substantial difference in the amount of development
taking place in 2007 as compared to 2000. The year 2007 represents the peak year of
well completions for the Barnett formation. Of note is that Johnson County‘s production
began in 2003, and that county is considerably less populated than Denton and Tarrant
counties. Hence, Johnson County provides a situation of extremely high development
compressed in a comparably short period of time, which provides us with an opportunity
to observe an extremely high rate of development over time compared to the other core
counties. These data were the basis for determining overall activity in the core Barnett
counties, as the entire model stems from determining a per well measure of activity.
Table 6. Annual Well Completions (Barnett)

Note that as of the end of 2007 Johnson County represents almost 44% – 43.93%
to be precise – of all shale gas development within the core counties.
4.1.2.2 Truck trip calculations
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Table 7 shows an estimate of the number of trips necessary to drill and frack the
wells in each core county during the subject years. The calculations are based on the
assumption that each well requires an average of 3 million gallons of water. Even at an
average of only 3 million gallons of water per well and at relatively low levels of
development, the result in terms of increased traffic can be enormous, and potentially
enough to simply overwhelm the infrastructure of various localities. These trucks, often
weighing 20 times as much as regular cars, can damage roads to a much greater degree
than their weight would suggest. Because the weight of the trucks often exceeds the
weight limits of these roads and highways by orders of magnitude, the stress these trucks
place upon roadways affects the underlying infrastructure more than merely looking at
truck trips and mileage. Even for purposes of this research, conservative estimates were
employed so as not to potentially overstate the effects associated with shale gas
development. The following calculations are based on research by the Highway Research
Board (―Advocates‖), which determined that a single 40-ton (80,000 pound) tractortrailer truck imposes as much damage on highways as 9,600 average-sized passenger
cars.
Table 7. Number of Drilling Truck Trips (3 million gallon estimate)

Table 8 illustrates the number of truck trips based on an average of 4.5 million
gallons of water (the high estimate). Like the estimates in the table above, these numbers
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are based on research by the Highway Research Board and further illustrate the issues
evident at an average of 3 million gallons per well. Together, these numbers provide a
baseline range to consider for calculating overall infrastructural damage, particularly
when looking at other more water- and equipment-intensive shale plays.
Table 8. Number of Drilling Truck Trips (4.5 million gallon estimate)

4.1.2.3 Equivalent vehicle numbers
Table 9 below establishes equivalency figures for the two average water volumes,
which provides the likely damage range. The figures in Table 9 were calculated by
multiplying the estimated number of truck trips required to develop the wells sunk in the
respective years (at 3 million and 4.5 million gallons of water respectively) by the
number of estimated equivalent cars, and then divided by 365. Since the product of the
estimated number of trips and the passenger car equivalency factor would seem to
potentially overstate the damage incurred by the roads as a result of shale gas
development, that product must be tempered by the fact that the trucks in question do not
represent permanent new daily vehicles, but rather only single discrete trips. Therefore, in
order to temper the calculation of the numerator product, this study assumes that the truck
trips in question represent a single day‘s travel. By dividing the numerator product by the
number of days in the year, a more conservative estimate of additional traffic that shale
gas development imposes on the local infrastructure is determined.
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Table 9. Equivalent Vehicle Numbers (3 and 4.5 million gallon estimates)

4.1.2.4 Drilling adjusted vehicle numbers
Tables 10-11 show the numbers calculated by adding the estimated additional
traffic resulting from shale gas development to the data provided by TXDOT related to
registered vehicles. Both the equivalent registered vehicles (from a traffic standpoint) and
the additional estimated damage to local and state infrastructure are shown. These
calculations provide us with an estimated range of the unfunded damage incurred by
roads.
Table 10. Unfunded Damage (3 million gallon estimates)
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Table 11. Unfunded Damage (4.5 million gallon estimates)

4.1.2.5 Costs, overfunding, and unfunded damage estimates
From the data collected and analyzed on the 68 total counties of this study, it
became clear that the state of Texas has attempted to fund – at least partially – the repair
of infrastructure damage inflicted upon state highways by shale gas development. Since
this data made it clear that the core counties had received, on average, more funding for
road and highway repair from the state, even after controlling for population and increase
in registered vehicles, the remaining analysis will focus only on the four core counties of
Denton, Johnson, Tarrant, and Wise.
The goal of this research is to provide a clear model for policymakers to employ
in order to accurately assess compensatory taxation or appropriate user fees. By far, the
great majority of unconventional gas extraction in Texas has occurred in the four core
counties. By focusing on these four counties only, the results will be extremely clear and
more easily applicable for policymakers. Therefore, a fairer value for repair can be
determined by calculating a more accurate level of damage done and for which taxation
had not compensated the state and localities.
What should also be noted is that most trucking traffic for shale gas development,
by its very nature, occurs on local highways and roads. While state highways are often
built to higher engineering standards than local highways, that greater robustness and
capability to withstand more and heavier traffic means little if the greatest volumes of
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traffic occur on other roads and highways. This is one of the primary reasons the city of
Denton opted to assess local usage fees for drilling in the Barnett.70 Yet, despite these
additional fees, the money collected goes toward only the thoroughfares in Denton city
proper. According to Keith Gabbard, Street and Drainage Superintendent of the City of
Denton, Denton has collected approximately $1.5 million in usage fees (Gabbard). While
that money has gone quite a ways toward mitigating the damage from Barnett drilling
within Denton city limits, it by no means paid for it all, particularly in light of the price
increases for oil-related products like asphalt since the fee was made policy.
It should also be noted that the following data does not include the specific local
data on infrastructure spending in Texas. The focus on this research is to address state
budgetary policy concerns. While local infrastructure expenditures will likely affect the
following calculations to some minor degree, the intent is to show the magnitude of
difference between what is being spent currently and what should be spent. Therefore,
while the county data are likely available, the overall effect on the discrepancy between
county and local expenditures on the one hand, and actual under-funded and un-funded
damage on the other is likely to be rather small, as indicated by the amount of money
collected by way of usage fees (and the fact that these usage fees have proven
insufficient) by the City of Denton.
Table 12 shows the number of vehicles registered in each of the four core
counties, as well as data called Drilling-Adjusted Vehicle Numbers (DAVN). The DAVN
refer to the equivalent car traffic represented by drilling. The DAVN is calculated by first
Denton was chosen as the main locality of research for two primary reasons. First,
Denton experienced the earliest and greatest amount of development in the Barnett until
very recently, and second, the accessibility of personnel and their willingness to discuss
the topic of Barnett shale development made the research task a much less tedious one.
70
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multiplying the estimated passenger car equivalent, 9,60071, by the average number of
truck trips necessary to drill and frack the number of wells spud in a given year. Since
that calculation does not accurately model truck behavior as it occurs in the field – each
discrete truck trip should be counted as a single trip on a single day, rather than
multiplied out over an entire year‘s worth of traffic – the product must be altered to more
accurately represent the actual behavior of trucks. Otherwise, the product could
potentially vastly overstate the level of activity in question. This model uses the number
of days in a single year as an adjustment factor. The product of the estimated passenger
car equivalent and the average number of truck trips necessary to drill and frack the
number of wells spud in a given year is divided by 365. The resulting number gives a
more conservative, and likely more accurate, estimation of the actual traffic.
While the average well in the Barnett has required approximately 3 million
gallons of water to drill and frack, it makes sense to calculate the damage based upon that
volume of water – and consequently, the number of heavy trucks necessary to move that
amount of water. However, as with all other types of hydrocarbon development, the
easiest and cheapest to develop areas generally get developed first, so as to enable faster
realization of profit for a given drilling company. One should expect that, moving
forward, the amount of water necessary to drill and frack new wells will increase. This
will entail greater volumes of water and equipment, and consequently greater damage to
infrastructure.

This constant was developed by the GAO, and published in a 1962 report
(“EXCESSIVE”).
71
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Table 12. Drilling-Adjusted Vehicle Numbers

Table 12 shows that the DAVN is much larger than the number of vehicles
registered in the respective counties. Each of the counties above shows at least ten-fold
increases in equivalent traffic directly resulting from drilling. One would expect that,
accordingly, infrastructure damage would likewise increase by at least ten-fold. The
funding necessary to remediate that damage, just to maintain the status quo, must also
increase accordingly.
Table 13 below shows a number of separate pieces of data from which the
necessary calculations to build this model are developed. The calculations include per car
infrastructure spending for the four core counties, the change in per car expenditures
between 2000 and 2007, and the unfunded damage per water volume estimate. This data
is necessary for understanding the calculations for Table 14.
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Table 13. Infrastructure Costs, Overfunding, and Unfunded Damage Estimates72

The Overfunding Total represents the amount of money in dollars by which the
State of Texas increased infrastructure maintenance expenditures between 2000 and
2007, over the cost of inflation. This number is used to determine the amount by which
the actual infrastructure expenditures mitigate the Unfunded Damage calculation, which
shows the raw calculation of infrastructure damage, not controlled for actual
infrastructure spending.
While one might expect infrastructure expenses to increase in accordance with the
DAVN, that has not happened. As Table 13 clearly shows, infrastructure expenses
increased dramatically across all core counties from 2000 to 2007, but the increase is not
enough to maintain the roads as they were prior to drilling.
The Road Maintenance Costs (Actual) data were provided by TXDOT. The
Necessary Road Maintenance Costs are the sum of the actual road maintenance costs and
the Revised Unfunded Damage caused by drilling activity. The unfunded damage is
calculated by first determining the infrastructure maintenance cost per vehicle, then
72

Costs were adjusted for inflation – all calculations are made in 2007 dollars for
comparison purposes.
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multiplying that dollar value by the DAVN, and then adjusted based upon the actual
maintenance funding data. The Revised 2007 Unfunded Damage is calculated by
subtracting the Overfunding Total from the Unrevised, i.e., raw, Unfunded Damage, as
shown in the table above.
The product of that calculation provides a more complete assessment of the
damage imposed by the large trucks involved in drilling on the state and local highways.
Table 14. Road Maintenance Costs (Actual and Estimated)

While this model vastly simplifies the process of determining the precise amounts
of damage being done, the point is that it provides a much more accurate picture of the
magnitude of the policy concerns involved in shale gas drilling and should be considered
a starting point for the accurate assessment of infrastructure costs associated with shale
gas development. This model does not attempt to provide a model that addresses certain
other complicating factors, such as increased damage to infrastructure resulting from
previously unrepaired damage. As with many problems, unaddressed damage tends to
compound over time, particularly as the stress in question does not abate. This is most
certainly the case with road and highway maintenance. Oftentimes, such problems must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This fact should not be presumed to undermine the
baseline calculations above. Rather, those problems would serve to likely increase the
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necessary funding for damage mitigation, since the tendency has been to allow
infrastructure improvements and repair to go lacking.
For example, asphalt and concrete are designed with cracks and joints
respectively, to provide both room for expansion and improved performance under
impact loading. As these cracks and joints degrade over time and due to increased loadbearing, they lose their strength, resulting in faster degradation. Also, higher vehicle
speeds and larger loads make the impact and load-bearing burden imposed upon these
roads greater, particularly at the asphalt cracks and concrete joints.
It should be noted that a number of factors will affect the accuracy of the
calculations within this study. All calculations in this analysis assume that trucks carry
standard loads according to weight; hence, there is an assumption of 80,000 pounds per
load. However, numerous studies have found that many of the loads the trucks in
question carry are overloaded in order to reduce transportation costs (―Institute‖).
Overloading will cause considerably more severe damage overall to highways and roads,
as damage incurred by highways and roads tends to increase exponentially once the safe
operating parameters have been breached. It is very difficult to obtain accurate
overloading information from drilling companies, as that information is not necessarily
considered public record and the release of those data are not in the financial or political
best interests of drilling companies. For future studies, more reliable data should be used
to increase accuracy of analysis results. New data should become more easily accessible
as time goes on.

4.1.3 Marcellus
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4.1.3.1 Annual well completions
For the Marcellus formation calculations, the same process used to determine
infrastructure costs in the Barnett is being used to determine a baseline and subsequently
a projection of necessary infrastructure costs based on projected well completions.
Table 15 shows the number of wells completed in the twenty-five counties with active
well completions in the Marcellus formation during 2010.73 Counties at that point in time
with the highest number of well completions include Washington (221), Greene (194),
Bradford (169), Tioga (128), and Susquehanna (109).

73

Because the Marcellus formation has only recently seen substantial development, it is
not yet possible to compare production over time with any relevant results.
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Table 15. Annual Well Completions (Marcellus)
Allegheny
3
Armstrong
41
Bradford
169
Butler
33
Cambria
1
Cameron
4
Centre
12
Clarion
6
Clearfield
19
Clinton
23
Elk
6
Fayette
87
Forest
1
Greene
194
Indiana
16
Jefferson
4
Lycoming
37
McKean
8
Potter
20
Somerset
4
Susquehanna
109
Tioga
128
Warren
2
Washington
221
Westmoreland
75
Source: Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection

4.1.3.2 Truck trip calculations
Table 16 develops an estimate of the number of trips necessary to drill and frack
the wells in each active county, with values calculated at both 3 million and 4.5 million
gallon estimates (low and high water volume estimates). This provides the range of truck
trips due to drilling estimated in 2010.
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Table 16. Number of Drilling Truck Trips (3 and 4.5 million gallon estimates)
3 million
4.5 million
Allegheny
2,715
3,960
Armstrong
37,105
54,120
Bradford
152,945
223,080
Butler
29,865
43,560
Cambria
905
1,320
Cameron
3,620
5,280
Centre
10,860
15,840
Clarion
5,430
7,920
Clearfield
17,195
25,080
Clinton
20,815
30,360
Elk
5,430
7,920
Fayette
78,735
114,840
Forest
905
1,320
Greene
175,570
256,080
Indiana
14,480
21,120
Jefferson
3,620
5,280
Lycoming
33,485
48,840
McKean
7,240
10,560
Potter
18,100
26,400
Somerset
3,620
5,280
Susquehanna
98,645
143,880
Tioga
115,840
168,960
Warren
1,810
2,640
Washington
200,005
291,720
Westmoreland
67,875
99,000
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection; Highway Research Board

4.1.3.3 Equivalent vehicle numbers
Table 17 establishes vehicle equivalency figures for the two average water
volumes. The figures in Table 17 were calculated by multiplying the estimated number of
trips required to develop the wells sunk in the respective years (at 3 and 4.5 million
gallons of water respectively) by the number of estimated equivalent cars, and then
divided by 365, as in the Barnett calculations above.
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Table 17. Equivalent Vehicle Numbers (3 and 4.5 million gallon estimates)
3 million
4.5 million
Allegheny
71,408
104,153
Armstrong
975,912
1,423,430
Bradford
4,022,663
5,867,310
Butler
785,490
1,145,688
Cambria
23,803
34,718
Cameron
95,211
138,871
Centre
285,633
416,614
Clarion
142,816
208,307
Clearfield
452,252
659,638
Clinton
547,463
798,510
Elk
142,816
208,307
Fayette
2,070,838
3,020,449
Forest
23,803
34,718
Greene
4,617,732
6,735,255
Indiana
380,844
555,485
Jefferson
95,211
138,871
Lycoming
880,701
1,284,559
McKean
190,422
277,742
Potter
476,055
694,356
Somerset
95,211
138,871
Susquehanna
2,594,499
3,784,241
Tioga
3,046,751
4,443,879
Warren
47,605
69,436
Washington
5,260,405
7,672,636
Westmoreland
1,785,205
2,603,836
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection; Highway Research Board

4.1.3.4 Drilling adjusted vehicle numbers
Table 18 shows the numbers calculated by adding the estimated additional traffic
resulting from shale gas development to the data provided by PennDOT related to
registered vehicles. Both the equivalent registered vehicles (from a traffic standpoint) and
the additional estimated damage to local and state infrastructure are shown.
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Table 18. Drilling-adjusted Vehicle Numbers and Unfunded Damage
3 million
4.5 million
estimated
unfunded
estimated
unfunded
vehicles
damage
vehicles
damage
Allegheny
777,742 $
6,201,198.11
810,487 $
9,044,841.45
Armstrong
1,020,111 $ 263,024,805.84 1,467,629 $ 383,638,390.83
Bradford
4,058,862 $ 1,953,422,988.56 5,903,509 $ 2,849,191,541.33
Butler
926,385 $
81,978,070.59 1,286,583 $ 119,570,224.51
Cambria
112,535 $
5,327,606.19
123,450 $
7,770,652.13
Cameron
98,228 $
75,649,463.14
141,888 $ 110,339,548.44
Centre
356,496 $
45,999,860.00
487,477 $
67,093,718.45
Clarion
165,015 $
70,740,662.82
230,506 $ 103,179,751.30
Clearfield
498,733 $ 127,621,954.15
706,119 $ 186,144,728.71
Clinton
568,397 $ 494,478,457.41
819,444 $ 721,228,247.27
Elk
162,755 $
36,906,068.68
228,246 $
53,829,846.03
Fayette
2,158,565 $ 384,545,207.26 3,108,176 $ 560,883,617.22
Forest
26,849 $
19,347,963.92
37,764 $
28,220,234.66
Greene
4,638,305 $ 2,178,430,262.97 6,755,828 $ 3,177,378,947.09
Indiana
429,133 $ 128,559,759.20
603,774 $ 187,512,576.95
Jefferson
121,699 $
32,535,004.30
165,359 $
47,454,370.92
Lycoming
952,034 $ 172,184,102.38 1,355,892 $ 251,141,453.19
McKean
212,988 $
68,045,759.32
300,308 $
99,249,063.31
Potter
485,353 $ 411,582,659.91
703,654 $ 600,319,459.75
Somerset
143,213 $
29,669,067.14
186,873 $
43,274,219.47
Susquehanna
2,620,116 $ 1,335,088,392.79 3,809,858 $ 1,947,311,246.94
Tioga
3,070,670 $ 1,376,385,488.10 4,467,798 $ 2,007,545,684.30
Warren
70,141 $
17,644,808.85
91,972 $
25,736,074.79
Washington
5,390,607 $ 1,192,170,029.74 7,802,838 $ 1,738,855,733.98
Westmoreland
2,010,952 $ 190,024,815.62 2,829,583 $ 277,163,266.98
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania Department
of Transportation; Highway Research Board

4.1.3.5 Costs, overfunding, and unfunded damage estimates
Table 19 shows actual and estimated maintenance costs based on shale gas
development in the Marcellus. Actual road maintenance cost data were provided by
PennDOT. The necessary road maintenance costs are the sum of the actual road
maintenance costs and unfunded damage caused by drilling activity. Unfunded damage is
calculated by first determining the infrastructure maintenance cost per vehicle, then
multiplying that value by the drilling-adjusted vehicle numbers, then further adjusted
based on actual maintenance data. The product of that calculation provides a more
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complete assessment of the damage imposed by large trucks involved in drilling on state
and local roads.
Table 19. Road Maintenance Costs (Actual and Estimated)
Road
Necessary Road Maintenance Costs
Maintenance
Costs (Actual)
3 million
4.5 million
Allegheny
$ 61,339,116.40 $
67,540,314.51 $
70,383,957.85
Armstrong
$ 11,912,374.76 $ 274,937,180.60 $ 395,550,765.59
Bradford
$ 17,578,394.84 $ 1,971,001,383.40 $ 2,866,769,936.17
Butler
$ 14,704,571.94 $
96,682,642.53 $ 134,274,796.45
Cambria
$ 19,860,283.23 $
25,187,889.42 $
27,630,935.36
Cameron
$ 2,397,144.54 $
78,046,607.68 $ 112,736,692.98
Centre
$ 11,412,159.96 $
57,412,019.96 $
78,505,878.41
Clarion
$ 10,995,736.85 $
81,736,399.67 $ 114,175,488.15
Clearfield
$ 13,116,570.70 $ 140,738,524.85 $ 199,261,299.41
Clinton
$ 18,907,965.96 $ 513,386,423.37 $ 740,136,213.23
Elk
$ 5,152,558.85 $
42,058,627.53 $
58,982,404.88
Fayette
$ 16,290,502.49 $ 400,835,709.75 $ 577,174,119.71
Forest
$ 2,475,929.19 $
21,823,893.11 $
30,696,163.85
Greene
$ 9,705,381.47 $ 2,188,135,644.44 $ 3,187,084,328.56
Indiana
$ 16,300,702.89 $ 144,860,462.09 $ 203,813,279.84
Jefferson
$ 9,051,344.55 $
41,586,348.85 $
56,505,715.47
Lycoming
$ 13,946,167.22 $ 186,130,269.60 $ 265,087,620.41
McKean
$ 8,063,780.80 $
76,109,540.12 $ 107,312,844.11
Potter
$ 8,038,771.20 $ 419,621,431.11 $ 608,358,230.95
Somerset
$ 14,958,094.92 $
44,627,162.06 $
58,232,314.39
Susquehanna
$ 13,182,107.31 $ 1,348,270,500.10 $ 1,960,493,354.25
Tioga
$ 10,805,532.81 $ 1,387,191,020.91 $ 2,018,351,217.11
Warren
$ 8,352,891.66 $
25,997,700.51 $
34,088,966.45
Washington
$ 29,507,786.58 $ 1,221,677,816.32 $ 1,768,363,520.56
Westmoreland
$ 24,029,464.70 $ 214,054,280.32 $ 301,192,731.68
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation; Highway Research Board

4.1.4 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (discussion)
It is clear from the above calculations that, while Texas has experienced
considerably more infrastructure stress and damage than areas in Pennsylvania as a direct
result of Barnett development, this is a temporary situation. As the Marcellus formation is
further developed, the sheer volumes of in situ gas and the rural aspect of Marcellus
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development will lead directly to substantially more infrastructure damage – perhaps
orders of magnitude more damage.
4.2 Water
4.2.1 Introduction
Shale gas drilling currently requires large volumes of water. However, despite the
volume of water needed to produce gas from shale, even at peak activity, the process may
only account for only between 1% and 3% of total water consumption in a given area.
More telling is the comparison between the amount of water required for drilling and the
vast volumes of water available for use. The best estimates available show that drilling
usage does not necessarily produce a price effect (Nickerson). This lack of a price effect
is mostly due to the way in which water is collected for use, either through the sinking of
private wells or purchasing water from private property owners.
Even in drought conditions, as happens regularly in Texas, water usage for shale
gas development does not necessarily overtly affect available volumes of water for other
uses. However, the simple fact remains that water is being used, and in rather large
quantities. More importantly, companies use much of that water without any manner of
financial remuneration to the state or, in Pennsylvania‘s case, the Commonwealth.
Oftentimes, even when companies compensate property owners for water usage, the price
paid does not accurately reflect the economic value of water, and certainly does not factor
the cost of remediation for potential spills or surface- or groundwater pollution. If for no
other reason than for the potential for water pollution, some accounting of those facts
should be taken. Moreover, since water is a communal resource, the potential for
assigning real economic value should be considered.
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4.2.2 Barnett
4.2.2.1 Number and type of well
Large amounts of water have been used to develop the Barnett shale formation.
Estimates of water usage for all drilling and fracking in the Barnett are as high as 2% of
the total water used in this region. 74 While such relatively small percentages of water do
not sound like a serious threat to the Texas water supply and generally will not have a
measureable effect upon the cost of water, the activities that require this water have the
potential for destroying water sources – particularly if the activity is pursued without
proper care – creating the potential for even percentage use as comparatively small as
what shale gas development represents to be large enough to alter the overall cost of
water.
As of September 2010, the month with the highest number of active wells on
record, drilling and extraction companies have drilled a total of at least 14,891 wells, the
vast majority of which were horizontally drilled and fracked. It is assumed that some
previously active wells had fallen out of production, and other active wells may have
been drilled vertically. 75 This should not greatly affect the total amounts of water
necessary for development.

74

According to Chesapeake Energy, one of the primary companies operating in the
Barnett and Marcellus shale formations, this data was acquired from a 2006 report from
the Texas Water Board and a study conducted in 2007 by Dr. Peter Galusky of the
environmental consulting firm, Texerra, and commissioned by the Gas Technology
Institute (―Water Management‖).
75
The hydraulic fracturing process generally requires many times more water to develop
a well than the more traditional vertical technologies. Since the vast majority of wells
drilled in the Barnett since 2000 have been horizontally drilled and hydrofracked, one can
assume that substantially more water has been employed in the gas development than
would have otherwise been the case had only vertical drilling technology been used.
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4.2.2.2 Gas volume per well
As of December 2010, the average Barnett well has produced approximately
554,347.96 MCF of natural gas.76 At that point in time, the Barnett represented the most
actively fecund shale gas formation in the world. While this is due mostly to the Barnett
formation representing one of the first shale gas developments in the world, the amount
of natural gas being produced in the Barnett is not insignificant.
4.2.2.3 Water volume per well
Using an average volume of water of 4.5 million gallons per well, 77 the total
amount of water necessary to perform the drilling in the Barnett formation total over 67
billion gallons (67,009,500,000).
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This figure was calculated by dividing the total volume of natural gas extracted from
active Barnett wells from January 2000 to Dec 2010 by the number of wells in production
as of December 2010. As stated above, some wells certainly have fallen out of
production, while others have come online during the period in question. The calculation
above is simply a thumbnail calculation to determine overall per well production.
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According to a Chesapeake Energy factsheet, a typical shale gas well requires
approximately 250,000 gallons of water for the actual drilling, and another
3.8 million gallons per well to perform the fracing process itself. Other companies may
use more or less depending upon the specifics of their processes. Other sources within the
industry put the estimated total water usage per well above 4.5 million gallons. It should
also be noted that every additional frac stage requires additional water, and the amount of
water necessary to perform a successful frac depends heavily upon on a number of
factors, not least of which is the thickness of the formation itself, which varies by
location. Typically, companies will drill in the easiest, most accessible, and cheapest
locations first. Later, the more difficult, deeper, denser, less profitable areas will be
developed. This also extends to water usage, as it typically requires more water as
complications in drilling are added. According to another Chesapeake factsheet, the
company claims to only use approximately 3.5 million gallons of water during the
fracking process. A third factsheet (July 2010) claims that 5 million gallons of water are
needed to drill and hydraulically fracture a shale gas well. The various numbers should,
more than anything, illustrate the wide estimates provided by various private companies
regarding their operations (―Barnett Water Use‖, ―Water Management‖).
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4.2.2.4 Water usage – municipal sources
Natural gas drilling companies often purchase water from municipal sources
(―Water Use Fact Sheet‖). While this does not necessarily affect the overall amount of
water available underground, it can affect the total amount of water available from
surface municipal sources, and can have an effect on the overall amount of water
produced. When using municipal water sources, gas companies pay according to volume
used. Due to price breaks made available for commercial/industrial users and at higher
levels of consumption/use, gas companies do not typically pay for water at a rate
commensurate with residential users. Still, there exists a distinct financial interest for gas
companies to not pay for water usage if at all possible.
4.2.2.5 Flowback water disposal/containment
In the Barnett play, most flowback is removed from the well site by water tanker
trucks. The flowback water is then typically injected into underground salt caverns that
function as disposal wells. 78 Some water gets reused immediately or recycled for later
use. According to the TRRC, the estimate for recoverable volume of injected frack water
is approximately 70%, leaving around 30% in the ground (―Water Use in the Barnett‖).
According to Nicot and Potter, ―[a]bout 30% of the injected water returns without too
much of a quality decrease, whereas the remaining 40% is more degraded.‖ These are
average statistics and can vary greatly from well to well, based on the local
characteristics of the formation as well as the standard operating procedures of a given
producer.
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According to Chesapeake Energy‘s website, the company injects unusable flowback
water into a deep underground geological formation called the Ellenburger formation, a
porous rock formation that rests beneath the Barnett formation (―Barnett Shale
Production‖).
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Table 20. Barnett Play Water Usage Estimates

In Table 20, the estimates of water usage were based upon establishing a range (based
on average water estimates provided by Chesapeake‘s public releases and the Tarrant
County League of Women Voters). Recycling water (represented by the ―recycling
rate‖79 in the table) can have a significant impact on the total amount of water employed
for shale gas development. As recycling becomes more efficient and cost-effective, it is
expected that usage of recycled water will increase.
4.2.3 Marcellus
4.2.3.1 Number and type of well
Between 2008 and 2010, natural gas operators drilled a total of 2,349 Marcellus
shale wells in Pennsylvania (―PermitDrilledmaps‖). The vast majority of these wells were
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The recycling factor is based upon official statistics released by Chesapeake.
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drilled horizontally and therefore used substantially greater volumes of water than
vertical or conventional wells.
4.2.3.2 Gas volume per well
As of December 2010, the average Marcellus well produced approximately
318,380.81 MCF. While there is a substantial difference between the gas per well
produced in the Barnett and Marcellus plays, this can be explained by the length of time
each respective play has been actively producing natural gas. While the Barnett has
produced almost 250,000 MCF more per well, the play has also been active for eight
more years. All indications in the Marcellus actually point to a much greater per-well
extraction volume over the lifespan of each well when compared to the Barnett play.
4.2.3.3 Water volume per well
Using an average volume of water of 4.5 million gallons per well, the total
amount of water necessary to perform the drilling in the Marcellus up to the end of 2010
totals over 10 billion gallons (10,570,500,000 gallons).
4.2.3.4 Water usage – municipal sources
To date, most water used for hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus has been from
surface sources. While some operators have obtained water from municipal sources, the
nature of the Marcellus play itself – primarily rural, with many available surface water
sources in Pennsylvania – operators can typically collect most of the water needed for
the extraction process without using municipal sources.
4.2.3.5 Flowback water treatment
Since Pennsylvania has no underground formation equivalent to the salt caverns
in the Barnett, flowback water is primarily hauled by tanker truck to sewage plants for
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treatment and discharge into rivers, or until recently to injection wells in northeastern
Ohio. Both options have been documented as potentially threatening, because of issues
with water contamination and microquakes.80
Table 21. Marcellus Play Water Usage Estimates.

4.2.4 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (volume)
As of December 31st, 2010, a total of 533,132,080.9 MCF81 had been extracted
from the Marcellus formation. By comparing this data to the Barnett data, the Marcellus‘
first two years is on par with the initial years of Barnett production. In May 2000, total
Barnett production stood at 200,106,145 MCF, with a monthly production of 5,864,695

80

The New York Times reported extensively on the concerns of radioactivity in drinking
water and the inability of sewage plants that accept drilling waste for treatment to test and
properly treat flowback water. Pennsylvania is also the ―only state that has allowed
drillers to discharge much of their waste through sewage treatment plants into rivers‖
(Urbina).
81
The DEP data, amounting to releases by 55 of 73 operating companies currently active
in the Marcellus, provided no unit of measurement for the volume. However, assuming
the data provided adheres to the industry standard, MCF, the data make sense.
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MCF. Production within the Barnett shale formation began back in 1993, at which time
the only production came from vertical wells.
It is more appropriate to look at data from the point at which companies had
developed more advanced techniques for shale gas extraction. Considering extraction
volume data from January 2000 onward, the point at which the Barnett reached the level
of extraction rates comparable to the Marcellus is November 2001. At this point the
monthly extraction in the Barnett had reached 13,520,365 MCF, from 1266 active wells.
4.2.5 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (Active wells)
As of September 2010, a total of 2,349 wells have been drilled (or spud) in the
Marcellus, 1,454 of which have been active, with a total of 533,132,080.9 MCF gas
extracted (―Marcellus Shale Production‖). Based on the estimate of the volume of water
needed to frack a well in the Marcellus82, approximately 10.57 billion gallons of water
should have already been used, in some capacity. This estimated water volume does not
account for water that has been treated or cleaned for reuse. The number of wells drilled
so far represents approximately 10% (9.764%) of the number of Barnett wells that are
currently operating, which stands at 14,891 at its peak in September 2010.
Assuming the Marcellus experiences identical well development activity, one
would expect volumes approaching the numbers discussed above as the total gross
amount of water to be used.
The numbers above do not tell the entire story. When the Barnett was producing
at the level of the Marcellus, there were approximately 76 inactive wells in Barnett as of
November 2001, out of a total of 1246. That leaves 1174 active wells, or 5.77% of
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Based on using 4.5 million gallons per well.
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Barnett wells being essentially either inactive or not ready for full-time production. By
comparison, at the same point in the Marcellus, 1454 wells have been spud, but only 872
wells reported activity, and 240 of those reporting zero production. While the well
numbers happen to be comparable, the active wells are not. Thus, while the number of
wells spud may be 1454, the actual number with any real extraction is 632, or 43.5% of
the wells.
4.2.6 Comparison between Barnett and Marcellus (Gas volume)
Since the average Marcellus well will require between 3 and 4.5 million gallons to
perform a successful frack, and if the number of wells only meets the number of wells
drilled in the Barnett, the estimated volume of water may be as high as 44,673,000,000
gallons, or slightly more than 44 billion gallons. While this estimate will likely be on the
low end, such a high volume of water may have dramatic effects upon localities.
The above numbers provide a vastly different perspective on production and
water usage. Therefore, while the per well production average in the Barnett at the
comparable volume was 170,448.16 MCF, the total per well production average for
active Marcellus wells is much higher, at 318,281.62 MCF. Therefore, the average
Marcellus well looks to be producing at close to twice the volume that the Barnett wells
are producing.
As it stands currently – as of the 2010 release of drilling activity – the Marcellus
seems to be using not just less water per well, but is producing considerably more gas per
well and per gallon of water used.83 In the Barnett, for comparable volumes,

This is probably due, in large part, to recycling and – more importantly – refracking in
the Barnett. In the Marcellus formation, little refracking has been performed since it is
83
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approximately 5,607,000 gallons of water were used. That equates to around 37.88 MCF
of natural gas produced per gallon of water used. This estimate is arrived at by dividing
the total gas volume produced by the product of active wells and average water usage per
frack job in the Barnett. For the Marcellus, the numbers diverge greatly. Using the same
equation, the result is 106.1 MCF per gallon of water used.
Undoubtedly, these proportions may change. The differences between the
Marcellus and Barnett production could be a function of the effects of newer and better
technology. However, it is clear that the Marcellus formation looks to be a considerably
richer play.
4.2.7 Water cost projections
Table 22 projects the estimated water costs in the Marcellus – Pennsylvania only
– based upon the current market water rates charged by Pittsburgh Water and Sewer
Authority (PWSA) 84 for industrial usage. It should be noted that Pittsburgh charges less
for industrial uses of water than for either residential or commercial uses. According to
PWSA rates, there is a minimum charge for metering for anything above 548,000 gallons,
$4,501.14 (―Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority‖). While drilling companies in the
Marcellus have generally refrained from using municipal water sources (because
Pennsylvania has an abundance of surface water sources), this calculation determines the
market value of the water being used, regardless of sourcing. For all volumes above
548,000 gallons, the rate, as seen in the table below, is $7.26 per thousand gallons.
such a relatively new play. The Barnett, by comparison, is a mature play, the production
of which having already peaked.
84
PWSA rates were used for illustration purposes only. Rate information was readily
available and it was assumed that the largest population center in the portion of the state
affected by the Marcellus formation would provide a reasonable estimate of the market
costs of water.
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This projection uses the estimated average of 4.5 million gallons of water to frack
each Marcellus well, plus the 500,000 gallons needed to drill each well, in order to
determine the projected cost per well. This projection also includes cost estimates based
on various recycling percentages of the overall water usage. With technology in this area
improving over the next few years, one should presume that companies would seek to
recycle as much water as possible, particularly if there is some monetary cost attached to
the initial water extraction.
If the companies already drilling in the Marcellus were to pay for the water
extraction estimated by this model, the potential for producing offsetting monies for
related externality costs could be considerable. As shown in Table 22, the cost for water
per well ranges from $18,585.57 (50% recycling) to $37,171.14 (no recycling). By
multiplying the number of wells that have been drilled by the various per-well water costs
at the various recycling rates, the unpaid compensation for water used for drilling and
fracking through December 2010 ranges from $43,657,503.93 (50% recycling) to
$87,315,007.86 (no recycling).85 Imposing market costs upon water usage would
presumably create a financial incentive for both improving the fracking process (using
less water overall), and improving the recycling process (pushing for more efficient and
more effective processes).
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These calculations are in current dollars (not adjusted for inflation).
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Table 22. Estimated water costs

Table 23 projects water usage and costs for the entire Marcellus gas formation,
based on previous experiences in the Barnett formation. According to the most recent
projections for extractable gas volumes in the Marcellus, a range is given, labelled High
estimate and Low estimate. The high estimate is based partially on the Engelder/Lash
projection, upon which all of Considine‘s projections were based. The lower estimate is
based on a number of other more conservative estimates. The final extractable volume
likely will fall somewhere between these two numbers. While the range does not offer
enough precision for longer term planning, the projections provide at least a starting point
from which policymakers can further understand what the Commonwealth may be facing
in the coming months and years.
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Table 23. Projected Water Costs (Marcellus)

Based on these projections for the number of wells necessary, and combining
those estimates with the estimates with the amount of water necessary to drill and frack
those wells, a range for the estimated volume of water needed to develop the entire
Marcellus formation has been calculated. The projections again factor in recycling at both
30% and 50%. Therefore, based on these estimates, Pennsylvania can expect water usage
to range from 1,126,385,899,000 (1.126 trillion) gallons to 4,238,994,262,000 (4.238
trillion) gallons.
Using the PWSA rate calculations from the table above, and combining those
with the water usage estimates for the entire Marcellus within the state, the aggregated
costs being carried by the Commonwealth that should require compensation in some form
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are calculated. There is a range, as with the above projections, based upon recycling rates,
as well as with the high and low extraction volume estimates. The range is from
$8,373,809,591,560.00 ($8.373 trillion) to $31,513,649,836,960.00 ($31.513 trillion),
over the entire extraction life of the Marcellus formation within Pennsylvania. This
sounds like a substantial amount of money, particularly if viewed as an up-front expense
for drilling companies. Instead, however, it makes greater sense to consider these values
over the life of the entire development of the Marcellus. In the worst case scenario –
assuming it requires a total of 5 million gallons of water to drill and frack each well – the
cost to a given drilling company will be $37,171.14 per well. According to some sources,
it currently costs between $5.0 and $6.4 million to fully develop a well (―Marcellus Shale
– Well Cost‖). If these numbers are accurate, even in the worst-case scenario of no
recycling, paying for water usage will only increase the cost per well by between
0.5808% and 0.7434%.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions (Policy Recommendations):
5.1 Introduction
The importance of preventing serious problems associated with extractive
industries in general, and shale gas development in particular, necessitates a change in
policy moving forward. While the impediments may seem difficult to surmount in the
current political environment, the current situation provides policymakers a unique
opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of others: namely, Texas, Alaska,
West Virginia, Norway, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
By forging a new path with a pragmatic set of policies that the Commonwealth
can adapt from other states and nations, Pennsylvania can pre-emptively address many of
the complications that will arise from shale gas development. This proactive stance will
also establish a certain precedent for any future extractive industries.
It is also critical to recognize that Pennsylvania is a policy trailblazer in the realm
of shale gas development. Pennsylvania lawmakers must work to establish clear,
equitable, and functional policies to circumscribe shale gas development, both to
accurately represent the needs of the Commonwealth and act as a model for other states.
These policy recommendations should not be misconstrued as anti-shale gas –
shale gas can and should factor greatly into a comprehensive state and national energy
plan. However, this discussion must include the potential negative externalities associated
with shale gas development, and provide for adequate remediation and preventative
measures.
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5.2 Policy Recommendations
5.2.1 Issue
Pennsylvania has tremendous underground natural gas resources in the Marcellus
shale formation (as well as the underlying Utica formation), the development of which
will produce substantial policy complications for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Those complications will include, but not be limited to: budgetary issues, particularly
infrastructural degradation and water pollution remediation; and microeconomic effects,
namely localized inflation, sectoral inflation.
Based on the experiences of other states and nations whose economies rely upon
extractive industries, Pennsylvania will likely encounter numerous problems that require
foresight and planning to mediate.
5.2.2 Policy Options
The most appropriate and effective way to address the complications arising from
extractive industries is to consider the problem holistically. Each of the following policy
recommendations is important to mitigate the associated problems, and will help to
equalize the benefits in a more equitable manner. In addition, proactively addressing
problems before they arise makes future problems easier to address, and will end up with
less difficulty when dealing with them. 86

Since we have already witnessed substantial problems in the Barnett – and even in the
Marcellus, despite being a relatively new development – it makes good sense to address
both past problems and future problems that can be predicted with almost perfect
certainty.
86
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5.2.2.1 Recommendation #1
The Commonwealth should establish and properly and sufficiently fund a shale
gas fund modeled upon natural resource funds already in place in states and nations
whose economic development is closely tied to or dependent upon extractive industries.
This is the most critical alteration to current policy. Such a fund will provide the
public means to address both short- and long-term problems associated with shale gas
development, as well as provide a template for dealing with future extractive industries.
Since the Dutch Disease/resource curse problems are both well-documented
phenomena associated with extractive industries, it seems only prudent to address such
problems proactively. There are many other associated externalities that are not currently
addressed, yet present profound and sustained complications for citizens affected by gas
drills. By creating a fund, the purpose of which is to directly mitigate these problems – be
they budgetary or microeconomic in nature – the Commonwealth can then remove these
problems from the political arena, making the subsequent identification of such problems
primarily bureaucratic.
Moreover, since it is clear that the user fees assessed by Pennsylvania upon
drilling operators are insufficient to fully address the problems associated with shale gas
development, this recommendation provides the Commonwealth with a way to provide a
socially beneficial outcome that should, for all intents and purposes, pay for itself.
Furthermore, the gas fund must avoid the problems that other states and nationstates have encountered. It makes sense operationally to establish this fund
constitutionally, like Alaska has, while at the same time removing all funding streams
and persistent accumulated funds from the omnibus budget of the Commonwealth. This
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will eliminate the possibility of future lawmakers succumbing to political and financial
expediency by mortgaging the future needs the gas fund is intended to address. Since this
fund is designed specifically to address problems associated with shale gas development,
it must be stressed that decisions for all expenditures from the fund must be outside the
purview of the legislative body once the fund has been established.
5.2.2.2 Recommendation #2
The source of financing for the fund mentioned above should be tied directly to
shale gas extraction, and should be a combination of per-well fees as well as a
comprehensive severance tax on total volumes of natural gas extracted. By applying upfront charges per well for infrastructure degradation and water usage based upon the
models in Chapter 4, the fund will have sufficient capital to both address problems
proactively and to address and react to problems as they develop.
As mentioned above, the gas fund must be sufficiently funded in order to provide
appropriate mitigative assistance where needed. Therefore, the source of financing for the
fund must be tied directly to shale gas extraction. The only way to do this fairly is to
create a funding structure based on a combination of per-well fees and a comprehensive
severance tax on total volumes of natural gas extracted. By applying up-front charges
similar in practice to user fees per well for infrastructure degradation, and water usage
based upon the models provided in Chapter 4, the fund should have sufficient capital to
both address problems proactively and to address and react to problems as they develop.
Since the issue of a severance tax has been shelved indefinitely by Governor Tom
Corbett, it remains questionable whether such a scheme could be successfully
implemented in the near future, particularly in light of the effectiveness of the industry
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lobby. Pennsylvania remains the only state in the country with a substantial, currently
active natural gas extraction operation and without some form of severance tax. Once
Pennsylvanians begin to observe the scale of associated negative externalities caused by
shale gas development, it stands to reason that Pennsylvanians will agitate for the
application of such a tax. While this approach in precludes the ability to proactively
address many problems, the likelihood of a tax being applied most certainly increases.
5.2.2.3 Recommendation #3
The Commonwealth should require that all water usage for shale gas
development must be paid for according to fair market value, via volume fees for all
water usage. Policymakers should also recognize that innovation can be fueled and
fostered by way of proactive policies that enforce new market realities upon specific
actors. By charging drilling companies for all water used in the fracking process, the
Commonwealth will essentially create a financial incentive for operators to develop new
and less water-intensive processes, including, but not limited to, better recycling
technology or water-free fracking technology.
Operators should pay fair market value to the state for the privilege of using
Pennsylvania water supplies. By taking this approach, the Commonwealth will be
directly fostering innovation in the realm of water treatment, as well as providing more
funding for potential remediation efforts associated with shale gas extraction. By
charging drilling companies for all water used in the shale gas drilling process, the
Commonwealth will establish a financial incentive for operators to develop new and less
water-intensive processes, including, but not limited to, better recycling technology and
water-free fracking technology.
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5.2.3 Rationale and Implementation
Such policy alterations are based on the experiences observed during the
development of the Barnett formation, as well as preliminary indications from initial
activity in the Marcellus formation. As companies develop more wells with current
technology, ever-greater volumes of water will be needed, and further road degradation
will occur, exacerbated both by well development in primarily rural areas and the
temperate climate of the region. Moreover, it should be noted that these issues should not
be presumed to represent all potential, or even likely, negative associative effects
stemming from shale gas development. Therefore, policies and funding options must be
of sufficient size to allow for addressing such unforeseen or expected negative
externalities.
The question remains, how can a gas fund contribute specifically to some of
these negative impacts in ways that a severance tax or usage fee won’t? There are a
number of different types of natural resource funds, each with their own purpose
and function. Alaska’s fund, for example, is controlled by the state legislature, and
functions much like a pension, whereby every Alaskan receives a yearly
disbursement. Contrast that with the Azerbaijani fund, designed essentially as an
earmark for the benefit of future generations. And of course, there are other funds –
stability funds – like in Norway, wherein the purpose is to provide sufficient
revenue for a central budget in case the overall value of hydrocarbons changes
dramatically, thereby negatively affecting royalties, upon which the national budget
relies.
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In Pennsylvania, as mentioned above, there exists no severance tax and
hence, no statewide budgetary reliance on royalty income. Furthermore, while there
is a tradition of viewing the mineral wealth beneath the feet of Pennsylvanians as a
nominally communal resource for benefit of the commonweal, the truth is that the
way in which modern capitalism manifests itself in the United States downplays
such communitarian notions of collective wealth, and thus there remains little
motivation to impose such paradigm upon the natural gas industry.
In addition, Pennsylvania benefits from being a component of a much larger,
much more deeply and widely diversified economy whereby many of the more
troubling economic concerns associated with extractive industries – namely the
Dutch disease and resource curse, characterized by a generalized inflation – would
seem to be less of a problem.
Yet, many undeniable complications do present themselves. As made clear by
the research presented earlier in this work, those problems will manifest in areas
least likely to possess the capability to address them in any meaningful, effective
way. Thus, Pennsylvania will be forced to set a new precedent, whereby the state
borrows liberally from the funds that work, and dispose of the aspects of these
funds that would not only be inappropriate for Pennsylvania policy issues, but could
potentially lead to larger problems down the road.
Hence, the establishment of the gas fund in Pennsylvania should focus on the
mechanics of how the fund is to operate - specifically, how the fund is managed, how
the disbursement of money from the fund will be carried out, and how its ability to
satisfy particular social problems can be distinguished from a tax or fee.
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While insulating the domestic economy in Pennsylvania from the flow of
hard currency does not present itself as a necessarily notable problem, the
multitude of other attendant problems which would necessitate the creation of such
a fund provides ample justification for establishing a fund that works, on the local
level, as a stabilization fund.
Paradoxically, the Pennsylvania Gas Fund should have at once a very broad
and yet a very narrow mandate. On the one hand, the fund should have the latitude
to address problems that have not yet been identified but that may manifest
themselves as development of the shale reserves proceeds. On the other, the fund
must be sufficiently constrained, by state legislative mandate, so that the function of
the fund focuses only on localities negatively affected by the shale development,
either directly or indirectly.
Ideally, the fund would require a separate bureaucracy that would focus
primarily on tracking development of the shale gas reserves and the attendant
effects that manifest as that development increases. The aim of such a separate
bureaucracy would be to insulate the fund from arbitrary political power struggles
and cronyism – problems that would fundamentally undermine the entire purpose
of the fund. The best way to successfully endeavor to do something along these lines
would be to elicit the help of various institutions of higher learning in the
Commonwealth, the interest of which is public service and the pursuit of knowledge
for the benefit of society at large. Not only would leveraging universities reduce
overhead, the fund would be able to synergistically partner with universities in such
a way that the state can develop its own class of specialists.
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Hence, with adequate funding, proper oversight, a premium placed upon
both independent research and the public good – both for the function of the fund
itself and for policy consistency moving into the future, the Pennsylvania Natural
Gas Fund would prove to be an effective and efficient arbiter of the potential
problems and solutions related to shale gas development throughout the state.
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Chapter 6: Future Work
Following the investigations described in this thesis, a number of projects could
begin, involving both the models established in Chapter 4 as well as the creation of new
models. While this work should not be presumed to be comprehensive, this work opens
the door for future research in the realm of other externalities. This research addresses
only two discrete components of budgetary and microeconomic effects of shale gas
development, and explores a well-established effective solution for those problems.
One of the main attendant effects of shale gas development that was not addressed
is housing prices, particularly localized prices in ‗hot‘ areas. One of the problems lies
with insufficient data sources to explore the problems. However, with proper funding and
a sufficient time horizon, many of these difficulties could be remedied.
Another effect of concern is sectoral inflation, particularly as it relates to the labor
market. As noted in Chapter 2, one of the major problems in other nations particularly is
the deindustrialization of certain regions as a direct result of extractive industries. While
this problem has been explored in other nations to some degree, it remains to be seen
whether any research has been pursued in the United States directly relating to extractive
industries. This goes beyond mere boom/bust cycles. Rather, the economic incentives on
the part of laborers tends to drive this particular trend.
While this is a small portion of the potential research opportunities that shale gas
development provides, this short list provides substantial research options moving
forward.
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